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A NEW FACE IN CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESPONSIBILITY: THE VALDEZ PRINCIPLES 
Valerie Ann Zondorak* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At present, corporate environmental responsibility is compliance-
oriented. Corporations are motivated to be responsible for the en-
vironment to the extent necessary to avoid liability under laws such 
as the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and 
Liability Act (CERCLA),l the federal securities laws2 and the Com-
munity Right-to-Know laws. 3 As the scope of liability under envi-
• B.A., Wesleyan University 1987, J.D., University of Pennsylvania 1990, associate at the 
law firm of Shereff, Friedman, Hoffman & Goodman in New York. The author would like to 
thank Robb Fox, Esq. for his guidance in preparing this article, and, as always, she is indebted 
to her parents, John and Evelyn Zondorak, and her fiance Michael Corasaniti for their 
continuing support. 
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988) (CERCLA). CERCLA, otherwise known as the Superfund 
Act, was enacted and funded in 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767, 2801 (1980). The law 
provides the mechanism for joint federal and state response to releases of toxic substances. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 9604. The main goals ofCERCLA are to: 1) facilitate the cleanup of hazardous 
waste disposal sites and other areas affected by the release of hazardous substances, and 2) 
to hold responsible parties liable for the costs incurred in cleaning up a site. Franc, Wrestling 
With Environmental Compliance, PA. CERTIFIED PUB. ACCT. J., Spring 1989, at 10. In 1986, 
CERCLA was amended and refunded. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act 
(SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). 
2 The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1988); the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78ll (1988). The Securities and Exchange Commission requires 
public corporations to disclose the material effects that compliance with environmental pro-
tection laws may have upon corporate operations and business. See infra notes 50-71 and 
accompanying text. 
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 11,001-11,050 (1988). The Community Right-to-Know laws establish federal 
reporting and disclosure standards that provide for public awareness when industry is using 
potentially harmful chemicals in the community. See Hazardous Chemical Reporting: Com-
munity Right-to-Know, 40 C.F.R. § 370 (1989); Toxic Chemical Release Reporting: Community 
Right-to-Know, 40 C.F.R. § 372 (1989). 
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ronmental laws expands,4 business managers increasingly turn to 
environmental consultants to determine whether company opera-
tions comply with federal and state statutory standards. 5 This ap-
proach to corporate environmental responsibility is marginally effec-
tive. Environmental regulation statutes set forth the corporate 
community minimum standards of environmental responsibility with 
which corporations must comply or face costly liability. 
On September 7, 1989, the Coalition for Environmentally Respon-
sible Economies (CERES) proposed a new approach to corporate 
environmental responsibility in the form of a voluntary code of con-
duct called the Valdez Principles. 6 The Valdez Principles are prog-
ress-oriented. They call on corporations to protect the environment 
aggressively, not merely to comply with the minimum environmental 
standards set by federal, state, and local governments. 7 The audit 
and disclosure provisions of the Valdez Principles are particularly 
ambitious because, in addition to asking corporations to go beyond 
what is currently required by law, they potentially expose signatory 
corporations to increased litigation, increased costs, and disclosure 
liability beyond that required by federal and state law. 8 
Section II of this Article discusses the expanding legal standards 
of corporate environmental responsibility under CERCLA and the 
federal securities laws. Section III explores the likelihood that the 
Valdez Principles will be equally, if not more, effective in motivating 
corporations to become aggressive in their approach to environmen-
tal responsibility. Section III begins with a look at the Sullivan 
Principles, a predecessor voluntary code of conduct, to determine 
whether voluntary codes of conduct can be effective. Section III also 
explores in depth the most controversial provisions of the Valdez 
Principles-the disclosure and audit provisions. Section III details 
the objections that have been voiced by potential signatories,9 and 
proposes a restructuring of these disclosure and audit provisions to 
4 See Gold, Federal Cleanup Act Discards Corporate Veil, 124 N.J.L.J. 254 (1989). In the 
past decade, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has heightened enforcement of 
CERCLA. [d. The government also has brought criminal prosecutions against corporate 
polluters. Finlayson, Environmental Consultants See a Business Boom, Bus. INS., Mar. 17, 
1986, at 18. 
5 Finlayson, supra note 4, at 18. 
6 Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies [hereinafter CERES], Valdez Prin-
ciples (Sept. 7, 1989) [hereinafter Valdez Principles]. 
7 See id. 
8 Feder, Who Will Subscribe to the Valdez Principles?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1989, § 3, 
at 6, col. 1. 
9 [d. at col. 6. 
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mitigate objections and facilitate wholesale acceptance of the Valdez 
Principles. 
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
Environmental laws and regulations force corporations to maintain 
a minimum level of environmental responsibility. The threat of civil 
and criminal penalties, assessable against both the business entity 
and the individuals in charge, is strong incentive to meet federal and 
state standards for disclosure, processing, and disposal of hazardous 
substances. 1o CERCLA,l1 the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 
(FWPCA),12 the Toxic Substances Control Act (ToSCA),13 the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),14 the Federal In-
secticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),15 and the federal 
securities laws16 set forth the federal standards for corporate envi-
ronmental responsibility. The expanding scope of corporate respon-
sibility in two of these areas is examined below, followed by a dis-
cussion of the path corporations have taken to acknowledge their 
responsibility. 
A. Corporate Responsibility Under CERCLA 
The scope of corporate liability for hazardous waste contamination 
under CERCLA is extensive. 17 Corporations that currently own and 
10 Penalties for violations of certain . environmental laws can total fines up to $10,000, 
assessment of damages, and imprisonment up to three years. Franc, supra note 1, at 10. Civil 
fines levied against the offending business entity or its officers can equal $5000 per day. [d. 
11 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988). 
12 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988). 
13 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (1988). 
14 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k) (1988). 
15 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988). 
16 See infra notes 50-71 and accompanying text. 
17 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607. CERCLA liability is for the most part grounded in the language 
of the statute's liability and definitional sections. [d. §§ 9601, 9607; see infra notes 18-29 and 
accompanying text. Recently, however, courts have begun to impose CERCLA liability based 
on a "piercing the corporate veil theory." See United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 
1193, 1200-03 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (courts may impose CERCLA liability on parent corporations 
under two alternate theories: direct liability under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) or derivative liability 
pursuant to traditional corporate veil piercing theory); Joslyn Corp. v. T.L. James Co., 696 
F. Supp. 222, 224-25 (W.D. La. 1988) (minority rule requiring courts to pierce the corporate 
veil in order to hold parent corporations or corporate officers liable for cleanup costs of 
subsidiaries under CERCLA), afl'd, 893 F.2d 80, 83 (5th Cir. 1990) (piercing the veil to impose 
CERCLA liability to be limited to situations in which the corporate entity is used as a sham 
to perpetrate a fraud or to avoid a personal liability). These cases address the liability of 
460 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 18:457 
operate contaminated property, or have formerly owned or operated 
contaminated property, are liable under CERCLA.18 Liability also 
extends to corporations that generated hazardous substances that 
were sent to the contaminated property19 and corporations that 
transported hazardous substances to the property.20 Notably, the 
notion of "owners and operators" who may be liable goes beyond the 
common scenario of the industrial company that owns and operates 
its oWn manufacturing plant. "Owners and operators" may include 
corporate tenants, brokers, developers, lenders, and mere landown-
ers.21 In addition, "property" includes not only industrial property, 
but also commercial and residential property. 22 
CERCLA imposes strict liability on corporate owners and opera-
tors.23 Thus, corporations can be held liable regardless of fault. 24 
Furthermore, CERCLA liability is joint and several. 25 As such, a 
corporation with a deep pocket may be held liable for the entire cost 
of response when it is only responsible for part of the contamination. 
corporate parents in control of subsidiaries whose operations violate CERCLA. While piercing 
the corporate veil is an extreme position for courts to take, the fact that it is being used to 
impose liability under CERCLA is another factor increasing corporate environmental respon-
sibility. For a further discussion of corporate liability under CERCLA, see Comment, Robbing 
the Corporate Grave: CERCLA Liability, Rule 17(b), and Post-Dissolution Capacity to Be 
Sued, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 855 (1990) (authored by Monica Conyngham). 
18 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(2). Former owners of contaminated property are liable only if 
they owned the property at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance. Id. § 9607(a)(2). 
"Disposal" is an ambiguous term and may be interpreted to mean any "discharge, deposit, 
injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing" of hazardous substances into the environment. 
Id. §§ 6903(3), 9601(29). 
19 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3). 
20 Id. § 9607(a)(4). Liability of corporate transporters under this section is limited to those 
transporters who actually choose the site where the hazardous substances were disposed. Id. 
21 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)-(D). Mere landowners, as current or former owners of 
property, are liable for response costs unless they are innocent landowners: persons who had 
no reason to know of the hazardous substance contamination at the time of purchase. 42 
U.S.C. §§ 9601(35)(A)(i), 9607(a), 9607(b)(3). Landowners who wish to avail themselves of the 
innocent landowner defense should inspect the proposed site prior to purchase and take 
advantage of any opportunity to do testing, consider whether the purchase price reflects the 
value of the property if uncontaminated, and consider any commonly known or ascertainable 
information available about the property. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B). In addition, courts deter-
mining whether a landowner may take advantage of the innocent landowner defense will 
consider whether the landowner had any specialized knowledge or experience at the time of 
purchase and whether the landowner had the ability to detect contamination prior to purchase. 
42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B). 
22 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(9), 9607(a)(I). 
23 United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chern. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 844 
(W.D. Mo. 1984), modified, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986). 
24 See id. 
25 E.g., United States v. Chern-dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802,810 (S.D. Ohio 1983). 
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To recover costs for which the corporation is not responsible, the 
corporation must sue for contribution from other responsible par-
ties. 26 
During the past decade the courts have expanded the scope of 
corporate responsibility under CERCLA. Shareholders and employ-
ees who have actively participated in management have been found 
personally liable for corporate CERCLA violations regardless of 
individual fault. 27 Those who have not actively participated in man-
agement have been held liable based on their ability or opportunity 
to control corporate operations. 28 In addition, lenders who have par-
ticipated in management of corporate business before or after fore-
closure similarly have been held accountable. 29 
This extension of CERCLA liability to individuals within the cor-
porate structure has raised both the base line of minimum corporate 
responsibility under the law and the level of environmental aware-
ness in the corporate board room. Some situations in which courts 
have held individuals and lenders personally accountable for corpo-
rate wrongdoing are sketched out below. The impact of this trend 
on corporate environmental responsibility is also considered. 
1. Shareholders Who Actively Participate in Management 
Shareholders who have a substantial ownership interest and who 
actively participate in management of the corporation may be per-
sonally liable for cleanup costs as "owner[s] or operator[s]"30 under 
CERCLA.31 Courts define active participation as involvement in the 
26 Corporations may obtain contribution from other responsible parties through any of the 
following three mechanisms: 1) private right of contribution under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B), 
see United States v. Conservation Chern. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391, 404 (W.D. Mo. 1985), 2) 
federal common law right of contribution, see Colorado v. Asarco, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 
1492 (D. Colo. 1985), and 3) express right of contribution under 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f). 
27 See infra text accompanying notes 31-33, 37-39. 
28 See infra text accompanying notes 34-36, 37-39. 
29 See infra text accompanying notes 41-48. 
30 New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985). "[Tlhe definition 
of 'owner or operator' excludes 'a person, who, without participating in the management of a 
... facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the facility. 
The use of this exception implies that an owning stockholder who manages the corporation 
... is liable under CERCLA as an 'owner or operator.'" Id. (citation omitted). 
31 See id. (president and sole shareholder who actively participated in management of the 
company is an owner and operator under CERCLA); United States v. Bliss, Nos. 84-2086C(l), 
87-1558C(1), 84-1148C(1), 84-2092C(1) (E.D. Mo. Sept. 27, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist 
file) (corporation's president and major stockholder who actively participated in management 
and had the authority to control disposal of hazardous waste was liable personally as an "owner 
and operator" under CERCLA); United States v. Northernaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742, 
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the day-to-day production and managerial facets of a business. This 
definition does not include participation solely in the financial aspects 
of management. 32 Minority shareholders who participate in manage-
ment may be held personally liable for CERCLA violations as well. 33 
2. Shareholders Who Do Not Participate in Management 
Recently, courts have expanded the scope of corporate environ-
mental responsibility under CERCLA to include shareholders and 
officers who do not actively participate in management. Liability of 
such individuals has been based on their overall responsibility for 
corporate operations34 or their capacity to control such operations, 
although they did not actively participate in the operations.35 The 
courts have considered the following factors in assessing the poten-
tial CERCLA liability of such non-participating shareholders: the 
individual shareholder's knowledge of, responsibility for, opportunity 
747 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (president and sole shareholder who had responsibility for, and played 
an active role in, storing and disposing of chemical waste was personally liable as an "owner 
and operator"), a/I'd sub nom. United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 
1989), cen. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1527 (1990); United States v. Conservation Chern. Co., 628 F. 
Supp. 391, 416 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (corporation's founder, president, and 93% shareholder who 
controlled the corporation's fiscal, management, and environmental operations was liable as 
an owner and operator under CERCLA); United States v. Mirabile, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 
1511, 1512-13 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (president and majority shareholder who managed corporate 
operations and had the capacity and opportunity to control the disposal of waste was personally 
liable under CERCLA); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chern. Co., 579 F. 
Supp. 823, 848 (W.D. Mo. 1984) ("a person who owns an interest in a facility and is actively 
participating in the management can be liable" (emphasis added», modified, 810 F.2d 726 (8th 
Cir. 1986); United States v. Carolawn Co., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2124, 2131 (D.S.C. 
1984) ("to the extent that an individual has control or authority over the activities of a facility 
from which hazardous substances are released or participates in the management of such a 
facility, he may be held liable for response costs"). 
32 United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994, 20,995 (E.D. Pa. 
1985). 
33 See United States v. McGraw-Edison Co., 718 F. Supp. 154, 157 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) (49% 
minority shareholder interest in the corporation coupled with active participation in manage-
ment was sufficient for imposing liability as an "owner and operator"); Vermont v. Staco, Inc., 
684 F. Supp. 822, 832 (D. Vt. 1988) (parent corporation's minority shareholders who partici-
pated in operations of the subsidiary were personally liable under CERCLA as owning and 
managing shareholders). 
34 See Michigan v. Arco Indus., 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1936, 1941 (W.D. Mich. 1989) 
(controlling shareholder and chairman of the board of directors may be liable merely for his 
overall responsibility for operation and management of the site owned by the corporation). 
35 See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chern. Co., 810 F.2d 726,745 (8th 
Cir. 1986) (president, founder, and majority shareholder of a corporation was held individually 
liable under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) because he had the capacity 
and general responsibility as president to control disposal of hazardous waste, despite the fact 
that he did not participate in day-to-day operations). 
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to control, and involvement in the disposal process or other processes 
likely to violate CERCLA.36 Thus, it is unlikely that the scope of 
environmental responsibility under CERCLA will expand to encom-
pass individuals who are mere equity participants. 37 
3. Employees Who Are Not Shareholders 
Courts have recently expanded the sphere of corporate environ-
mental responsibility under CERCLA to include certain employees. 
Employees of a corporation who participate in management, yet are 
not shareholders, may be held liable under CERCLA.38 
Employee liability in such circumstances is based on the individ-
ual's clear authority to direct operational activities that are in vio-
lation of CERCLA, regardless of whether the employee actually 
participated in these activities. 39 As in the case of the shareholder, 
the issue is whether the employee had authority to control the 
activity, not whether the employee possessed any formal ownership 
interest in the corporation. 40 
4. Lenders Under CERCLA 
CERCLA provides an express exception from liability for lenders 
who take a security interest in property requiring remediation and 
act primarily to protect this security interest.41 However, lenders 
must be careful not to participate in management of the borrower's 
business before or after foreclosure on the property. Otherwise, such 
participation may provided a basis for holding the lender liable as 
an "owner and operator" under CERCLA.42 
"0 Areo Indus., 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1940. 
37 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A). This is consistent with the language of CERCLA. The 
definition of "owner and operator" excludes a person who "without participating in the man-
agement ... holds indicia of ownership." Id. 
3R Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d at 744 (company vice-president was liable for 
arranging for transportation and disposal of hazardous substances). 
39 See United States v. Carolawn Co., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2124,2131 (D. S.C. 1984). 
"To the extent that an individual has control or authority over the activities of a facility ... 
he may be held liable for response costs." Id. 
40 Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d at 743. 
41 42 U.S. C. § 9601(20)(A). The definition of "owner and operator" excludes "a person, who, 
without participating in the management of a ... facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily 
to protect his security interest in the ... facility." I d. 
42 See Bergsoe Metal Corp. v. Fast Asiatic Co., 9lO F.2d 668, 672-73 (9th Cir. 1990); Guidice 
v. BFG Electroplating and Mfg. Co., 30 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1665, 1670-71 (W.D. Pa. 
1989); United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1204-05 (E.D. Pa. 1989); United 
States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F. Supp. 955, 960-61 (S.D. Ga. 1988), a/i'd, 901 F.2d 1550 
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a. Prior to Foreclosure 
Courts are divided as to which activities between a borrower's 
default and foreclosure fall within the protection of the lender ex-
ception. According to the standard adopted by a number of district 
courts, lenders are permitted to provide assistance and general man-
agement advice to borrowers without risking CERCLA liability if 
lenders do not "participate in the day-to-day management of the 
business either before or after the business ceases operation. "43 
Recently, however, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
has adopted a stricter standard for lenders seeking to take advantage 
of the lender exception. 44 According to the Eleventh Circuit, lenders 
may incur cleanup liability under CERCLA as "owner[s]" and "op-
erator[s]" by "participating in the financial management of a facility 
to a degree indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's treat-
ment of hazardous wastes. "45 Because it is uncertain which standard 
the other circuits will follow, to avoid liability lenders should refrain 
from both participation in day-to-day management and in financial 
management to the degree that it could influence hazardous waste 
disposal policy. 
b. Foreclosure and Post Foreclosure 
Recent interpretations of the lender exception under CERCLA 
indicate that lenders must be particularly careful of their actions in 
the course of and post foreclosure. 46 Voluntary foreclosure on prop-
erty, to protect security interests, may remove lenders' protection 
under this exception and ultimately expose them to "owner and 
operator" liability.47 If this interpretation continues to gain accep-
(11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 578-80 (D. 
Md. 1986); United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994, 20,996-97 
(E.D. Pa. 1985). 
43 Guidice, 30 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1669; Nicolet, 712 F. Supp. at 1205; Fleet Factors, 
724 F. Supp. at 960; Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996. 
44 See Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d. at 1557. 
45 Id. Under this standard, it is not necessary for the secured creditor to involve itself in 
the day-to-day operations of the facility in order to be liable. I d. 
46 See Guidice, 30 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1670-71; Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 
578-80. 
47 Guidice, 30 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1671. In Guidice, the court held that "[wlhen a 
lender is the successful purchaser at a foreclosure sale, the lender should be liable to the same 
extent as any other bidder at the sale would have been." Id. In such situations, the lender 
exemption does not apply once the lender becomes the record owner of the property. Similarly, 
in Maryland Bank, the court held that the lender exemption covers only those persons who, 
at the time of the cleanup, hold indicia of ownership to protect a security interest in the land. 
632 F. Supp. at 579. Accordingly, because a security interest is terminated upon foreclosure, 
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tance in the courts, lenders must forgo purchasing at foreclosure 
sales contaminated property in which they have security interests. 
If they do purchase contaminated property, they may face potentially 
expensive CERCLA liability as "owners and operators."48 
5. Impact of Expanding CERCLA Liability on Corporate 
Environmental Responsibility 
Extending CERCLA liability to lenders and individuals within the 
corporate structure creates internal pressure on corporations to be-
come environmentally responsible. Corporate officers and managing 
shareholders who face personal liability under CERCLA have a 
strong incentive to ensure that corporate operations for which they 
are responsible meet environmental requirements. Lenders called 
upon to provide financing for corporations also have incentive to 
assure that any corporate property they take as security will not 
subject them ultimately to environmental liability. In order to meet 
this increased pressure for environmental responsibility, the first 
step for most corporations is to assess current compliance under the 
environmental laws. The increasing use of environmental consultants 
and audits demonstrates that many corporations have taken this 
step.49 
B. Corporate Environmental Responsibility Required by Federal 
Securities Laws 
Environmental disclosure requirements set forth by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) under the Securities Act of 1933 
the lender exemption is lost once a lender becomes owner of the property at the foreclosure 
sale. However, at least one court has held that a lender may invoke the lender exemption to 
protect itself from a liability after foreclosure and purchase of the property if the lender made 
no effort to continue debtor's operations, and merely took prudent and routine steps after 
foreclosure to secure the property against further depreciation. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. 
at 20,996-97. 
48 The 1986 amendments to CERCLA lend support to a narrow reading of the lender 
exemption. Guidice, 30 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1670. It is likely that this interpretation 
will gain such acceptance. "State and local governments acquiring 'ownership or control 
involuntarily through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment' or similar means were 
excluded from liability as owners or operators. Any person who 'owned, operated, or otherwise 
controlled activities at the facility immediately beforehand' are held liable." Id. (citations 
omitted). "That Congress did not simultaneously amend the statute to exclude from liability 
lenders who acquire property through foreclosure might indicate that Congress intended to 
hold them liable as owners." Id. at 1670-71 (citing Tom, Interpreting the Meaning of Lender 
Management Participation Under Section lOl(20)(A) of CERCLA, 98 YALE L.J. 925, 926 
(1989». 
49 See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text. 
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(1933 Act)50 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act)51 
impose significant disclosure obligations on public corporations. In 
certain registration statements filed under the 1933 Act and in annual 
lO-K and quarterly 10-Q reports filed under the 1934 Act, registrants 
are required to disclose the material effects that compliance with 
federal, state, and local environmental protection provisions may 
have upon them. 52 These requirements force corporations to maintain 
a minimum level of responsibility in the area of environmental dis-
closure. 
1. The Standard of Disclosure 
The SEC requires that corporations subject to the regulations 
disclose material53 environmental information. 54 Under the SEC 
rules, corporations required to register must disclose the existence 
and nature of pending environmental litigation and the instances in 
which compliance with environmental laws "may necessitate signif-
icant capital outlays, may materially affect the earning power of the 
business, or cause material changes in registrant's business done."55 
In recent years, this disclosure standard has been noticeably ex-
panded. 
The language requires that the existence and nature of pending 
environmental litigation be disclosed. Currently, this includes disclo-
sure of any administrative or judicial proceeding "known to be con-
templated" by governmental authorities and arising under federal, 
state, or local provisions relating to the protection of the environ-
ment, or any other material pending administrative or judicial pro-
ceeding;56 any notices of violation, in the nature of cease and desist 
50 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1988). 
51 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78ll (1988). 
52 Environmental Disclosure Requirements, Securities Act Release No. 6130, Exchange 
Act Release No. 16,224, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 23,507(B) (Sept. 27, 1979). 
53 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1990); 17 C.F.R. § 240. 12b-2 (1990). 
54 Disclosures Pertaining to Matters Involving the Environment and Civil Rights, Securities 
Act Release No. 5170, Exchange Act Release No. 9252, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 23,507 
(July 19, 1971). 
55 [d. 
56 Compliance with Environmental Requirements, Securities Act Release No. 5386, Ex-
change Act Release No. 10,116, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 23,507(A) (Apr. 20, 1973). This 
amendment was made to Securities Act registration form S-l, item 9(a), instruction 5, 17 
C.F.R. § 239.11; form S-7, item 5(a), 17 C.F.R. § 239.26; form S-9, item 3(c), 17 C.F.R. 
§ 239.22; the amendment also was made to Securities Exchange Act registration form 10, 
item l(b), instruction 6, 17 C.F.R. § 249,210; finally, the amendment was made to periodic 
reporting form 10-K, item l(b), and item 5, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310. 
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orders, issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA);57 
any administrative proceedings initiated by the registrant;58 any 
administrative orders relating to environmental matters, whether or 
not the orders literally follow a "proceeding";59 and the nature of the 
relief sought by the government in a particular administrative pro-
ceeding. 60 
The SEC has expanded the scope of information that a registrant 
must disclose in those instances in which compliance with environ-
mental laws may necessitate capital outlay, affect corporate earning 
power, or change a business's financial position. The expanded ver-
sion requires disclosure of the following: the material effects that 
compliance may have on the capital expenditures, earnings, and 
competitive position of the registrant and its subsidiaries;61 material 
estimated capital expenditures for environmental control facilities 
for the remainder of the registrant's current and succeeding fiscal 
year, as well as such further periods as the registrant may deem 
material;62 and in certain circumstances, total estimated expendi-
tures for environmental compliance beyond two years in the future. 63 
2. Disclosure of General Policy Toward Compliance 
A registrant generally is not required to disclose the company's 
policy toward environmental compliance. 64 However, there are two 
57 Conclusions on Proposals Relating to Environmental Disclosure, Securities Act Release 
No. 5704, Exchange Act Release No. 12,414, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ~ 80,495 n.22 (May 6, 1976). 
58 Environmental Disclosure Requirements, Securities Act Release No. 6130, Exchange 
Act Release No. 16,224, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 23,507(B) (Sept. 27, 1979). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Compliance with Environmental Requirements, Securities Act Release No. 5386, Ex-
change Act Release No. 10,116, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 23,507(A) (Apr. 20, 1973). 
62 Conclusions on Proposals Relating to Environmental Disclosure, Securities Act Release 
No. 5704, Exchange Act Release No .. 12,414, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ~ 80,495 n.22 (May 6, 1976). 
'" Environmental Disclosure Requirements, Securities Act Release No. 6130, Exchange 
Act Release No. 16,224, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) '1 23,507(B) (Sept. 27, 1979). Disclosure of 
estimated capital compliance expenditures beyond a two-year period is necessary if it appears 
that after two years there nevertheless will remain material capital expenditures necessary 
for compliance, or if it appears reasonably likely that material penalties or fines will be imposed 
for non-compliance. In addition, disclosure of estimated capital compliance expenditures be-
yond two years is necessary if the registrant reasonably expects that these costs for any 
future year will be materially higher than costs disclosed for the mandatory two-year period. 
Id. 
64 Conclusions on Proposals Relating to Environmental Disclosure, Securities Act Release 
No. 5704, Exchange Act Release No. 12,414, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
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exceptions to this rule. First, when a corporation voluntarily dis-
closes information regarding environmental policy, it must make any 
additional disclosures that would be required to prevent its initial 
voluntary disclosure from being misleading.65 Second, if the corpo-
ration's policy toward compliance is reasonably likely to result in 
"substantial fines, penalties, or other significant effects on the cor-
poration, " the registrant may be required to "disclose the likelihood 
and magnitude of the fines ... and other material effects" in order 
to prevent the required disclosures from being misleading. 66 
3. Disclosure of Designation as a Potentially Responsible Party 
Recently, the SEC has imposed stricter disclosure requirements 
with respect to designation by the EPA as a potentially responsible 
party (PRP)67 under CERCLA. This crackdown was a result of the 
SEC's recent interpretation of the disclosure required by item 303 
of regulation S-K, Management's Discussion and Analysis of Finan-
cial Condition and Results of Operations (MD&A).68 According to 
the SEC's new position, management must disclose a known trend 
if management cannot determine that the trend is not reasonably 
likely to occur, and if management determines that a material effect 
on the registrant's financial condition would be likely if the trend 
were to come to occur. 69 
Application of these principles to the environmental context may 
(CCH) ~ 80,495 (May 6, 1976); Disclosure of Environmental Matters in Registration Docu-
ments, Securities Act Release No. 5627, Exchange Act Release No. 11,733, [1975-1976 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 80,310 (Oct. 14, 1975); Notice of Hearings Regarding 
Disclosure of Environmental Matters, Securities Act Release No. 5569, Exchange Act Release 
No. 11,236, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 80,110 (Feb. 11, 1975). 
65 Environmental Disclosure Requirements, Securities Act Release No. 6130, Exchange 
Act Release No. 16,224, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 23,507(B) (Sept. 27, 1979). 
66 Id. 
67 Designation as a potentially responsible party (PRP) means that the corporation poten-
tially falls into one of the four categories ofliable persons under CERCLA § 107(A). 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607(a). In other words, the corporation initially has been classified by the EPA as an 
"owner," "operator," "generator," or "transporter." See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying 
text. PRP status is significant because thereafter the corporation may be held jointly and 
severally liable for all response costs at the contaminated site unless one of the § 107(b) 
defenses or the innocent landowner defense fully relieves the corporation of liability, or the 
corporation receives contribution or indemnification from other PRPs and is thus relieved of 
the full burden of liability. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. 
68 Reporting Financial Condition and Results of Operation, Financial Reporting Release 
No. 36, Securities Act Release No. 6835, Exchange Act Release No. 26,831, Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ~ 72,436 (May 18, 1989). 
69 Id. ~ 73,193. 
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require disclosure of the potential effects of PRP status. By itself, 
designation as a PRP does not warrant disclosure because designa-
tion alone does not provide knowledge of a contemplated government 
proceeding. However, a registrant's particular circumstances cou-
pled with PRP status may provide such knowledge and trigger a 
responsibility to disclose. 70 Factors to consider in deciding whether 
a material effect is reasonably likely to occur and whether disclosure 
is necessary include the following: whether registrant has been iden-
tified correctly as a PRP; whether any statutory defenses are avail-
able; whether insurance coverage may be contested; and whether 
and to what extent potential sources of contribution or indemnifica-
tion constitute reliable sources of recovery. 71 
4. Impact of Expanding SEC Disclosure Requirements 
The expanding environmental disclosure requirements under the 
1933 and 1934 Acts necessarily will force corporations to become 
more environmentally responsible. Not only must corporations meet 
a higher minimum base line of corporate responsibility through in-
creased disclosure requirements, but also they must become more 
attentive to whether general corporate operations comply with en-
vironmental standards. Such attentiveness is required because gen-
eral operations, if in violation of CERCLA, ultimately translate to 
financial obligations under the securities laws. 72 
C. Corporate Response to Increased Liability 
Expanding personal liability under CERCLA, coupled with more 
stringent environmental disclosure requirements from the SEC, 
have caused corporations to become increasingly aware of environ-
mental responsibilities. This awareness is reflected in corporations' 
increased use of environmental audits and risk assessments to help 
manage environmental liabilities. 73 
70 Id. n.17. 
71 Id. ~ 73,193. 
72 Reporting Financial Condition and Results of Operation, Financial Reporting Release 
No. 36, Securities Act Release No. 6835, Exchange Act Release No. 26,831, Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ~ 72,436, ~ 73,193 & n.17 (May 18, 1989) (PRP status that may have a material 
effect on corporation's financial status must be disclosed); Disclosures Pertaining to Matters 
Involving the Environment and Civil Rights, Securities Act Release No. 5170, Exchange Act 
Release No. 9252, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 23,507 (July 19, 1971) (compliance with 
environmental laws may necessitate significant capital outlays). 
73 Finlayson, supra note 4, at 18, 19. 
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Companies increasingly use environmental audits to determine 
whether their operations and facilities comply with federal, state, 
and foreign environmental laws and regulations. To avoid acquiring 
environmental problems, firms involved in mergers and acquisitions 
increasingly perform environmental audits of real estate. 74 Lenders 
routinely seek information about environmental exposure when re-
viewing initial applications for loans with real estate offered as col-
lateral and when determining whether to foreclose on a security 
interest in property. 75 
Risk assessments commonly are used to examine a company's 
potential for third-party liability arising from a pollution incident 
and to implement measures to reduce the potential for third-party 
lawsuits. 76 The use of risk assessments has become increasingly 
important because corporate civil and criminal liability is expanding 
while corporate insurance coverage is diminishing. 77 
The growing use of environmental audits and risk assessments 
shows that corporate environmental responsibility is expanding un-
der the existing legal framework. Despite this increase in corporate 
awareness, however, it is questionable whether federal and state 
laws alone can foster a corporate environmental responsibility that 
aggressively will protect the environment. 
Legally imposed corporate environmental responsibility is subject 
to several inherent limitations. First, legally imposed environmental 
responsibility stresses corporate compliance with minimum stan-
dards to avoid costly liability. This liability scheme, by its nature, 
hinders aggressive protection of the environment. Corporations need 
74 Finlayson, Audits Reduce Pollution Exposure: Panel, Bus. INS., Apr. 28, 1986, at 55. 
75 Banks Scramble to Keep from Making Superfund Deposits, Wall St. J., Oct. 5, 1989, at 
1, col. 5. 
76 Finlayson, supra note 4, at 19. 
77 See id. at 18. Sudden and accidental pollution coverage has been excluded from most 
general liability insurance policies, and environmental impairment insurance is scarce at best. 
Id. In addition, even when sudden and accidental pollution coverage is included in a policy, 
there is no certainty that a particular discharge of pollution will be covered. Some courts have 
taken the position that the insured may recover only where the release of pollutants was 
abrupt and accidental. See, e.g., Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. Belleville Indus., Inc., 
407 Mass. 675, 680, 555 N.E.2d 568, 572 (1990); see also United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. 
v. Star Fire Coals, Inc., 856 F.2d 31,34 (6th Cir. 1988); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell-
O Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1317, 1326 (E.D. Mich. 1988); State v. Amro Realty Corp., 697 F. 
Supp. 99, 109-10 (N.D.N. Y. 1988). Other courts have held that the insured may recover under 
sudden and accidental pollution clauses merely where the discharge of pollution was "unex-
pected and unintended." See, e.g., Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 259 Ga. 333, 338, 
380 S.E.2d 686, 690 (1989); Summit Assocs. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 229 N.J. Super. 
56, 63, 550 A.2d 1235, 1239 (1988); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Van's Westlake Union, Inc., 34 
Wash. App. 708, 714, 664 P.2d 1262, 1266 (1983). 
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comply only with designated minimum standards to avoid legal re-
course. While minimum standards may increase through passage of 
new laws or reinterpretation of old laws, they always will limit the 
extent to which corporations must be responsible for the environ-
ment. 
Second, legally imposed corporate responsibility is the product of 
a reactive, not a proactive, lawmaking body.78 Accordingly, most 
environmental standards merely respond to, and address, develop-
ments that already have occurred,79 rather than take affirmative 
measures to protect the environment from future developments. A 
legal system that fails to orient corporations to the necessity of 
planning for the future environment again limits the extent of cor-
porate responsibility. 
It is unlikely that legally imposed corporate environmental re-
sponsibility alone will protect the environment in the manner nec-
essary to combat future environmental problems. The Valdez Prin-
ciples, however, do offer a potentially proactive and aggressive 
approach to corporate environmental responsibility. 
III. THE VALDEZ PRINCIPLES 
The Valdez Principles have the potential to foster aggressive en-
vironmental responsibility within the corporate community. They 
urge companies to abide by the following code: 
1. Protection of the Biosphere. 
We will minimize and strive to eliminate the release of any 
pollutant that may cause environmental damage to the air, water, 
or earth or its inhabitants. We will safeguard habitats in rivers, 
lakes, wetlands, coastal zones and oceans and will minimize con-
tributing to the greenhouse effect, depletion of the ozone layer, 
acid rain, or smog. 
78 Governments are reactive. R. BAUER & D. FENN, THE CORPORATE SOCIAL AUDIT 16 
(1972). Accordingly, laws passed by governments must also be viewed as reactive. 
79 For example, on November 10, 1989, the House passed a liability bill that provides 
extensive environmental protection in the event of oil spills and allows the states to set stricter 
liability standards than the federal government. House Adopts Bill on Oil Spills, N.Y. Times, 
Nov. 10, 1989, at A26, col. 5. The House previously had been opposed to giving the states 
such power, but the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska "seems to have shifted house thinking 
in the issue." Gold, House Passes Amendment on Spill Lia.bility, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1989, 
at A32, col. 1. This is a fitting example of how the government waits for events to occur 
before it formulates necessary policy, rather than anticipating policy that will deal effectively 
with such an event in the future. 
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2. Sustainable Use of Natural Resources. 
We will make sustainable use of renewable natural resources, 
such as water, soils and forests. We will conserve nonrenewable 
natural resources through efficient use and careful planning. We 
will protect wildlife habitat, open spaces and wilderness, while 
preserving biodiversity. 
3. Reduction and Disposal of Waste. 
We will minimize the creation of waste, especially hazardous 
waste, and wherever possible recycle materials. We will dispose 
of all wastes through safe and responsible methods. 
4. Wise Use of Energy. 
We will make every effort to use environmentally safe and 
sustainable energy sources to meet our needs. We will invest in 
improved energy efficiency and conservation in our operations. 
We will maximize the energy efficiency of products we produce 
or sell. 
5. Risk Reduction. 
We will minimize the environmental, health and safety risks 
to our employees and the communities in which we operate by 
employing safe technologies and operating procedures and by 
being constantly prepared for emergencies. 
6. Marketing of Safe Products and Services. 
We will sell products or services that minimize adverse envi-
ronmental impacts and that are safe as consumers commonly use 
them. We will inform consumers of the environmental impacts 
of our products or services. 
7. Damage Compensation. 
We will take responsibility for any harm we cause to the 
environment by making every effort to fully restore the envi-
ronment and to compensate those persons who are adversely 
affected. 
8. Disclosure. 
We will disclose to our employees and to the public incidents 
relating to our operations that cause environmental harm or pose 
health or safety hazards. We will disclose potential environmen-
tal, health or safety hazards posed by our operations, and we 
will not take any action against employees who report any con-
dition that creates a danger to the environment or poses health 
and safety hazards. 
9. Environmental Directors and Managers. 
At least one member of the Board of Directors will be a person 
qualified to represent environmental interests. We will commit 
management resources to implement these Principles, including 
the funding of an office of vice president for environmental affairs 
or an equivalent executive position, reporting directly to the 
CEO, to monitor and report upon our implementation efforts. 
10. Assessment and Annual Audit. 
We will conduct and make public an annual self-evaluation of 
our progress in implementing these Principles and in complying 
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with all applicable laws and regulations throughout our world-
wide operations. We will work toward the timely creation of 
independent environmental audit procedures which we will com-
plete annually and make available to the public. 80 
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The Valdez Principles are not subject to those limitations that 
hinder the development of corporate environmental responsibility 
under the legal system. First, the Principles are premised on an 
intent by corporations to make consistent, measurable progress in 
taking responsibility for the environment. 81 With the standard of 
responsibility under the Principles set at continuous progress, rather 
than consistent compliance, there is no inherent limitation on cor-
porate responsibility. Second, the Valdez Principles are developed 
by a proactive investor group. As such, the philosophy of the Prin-
ciples is not merely to respond to the present environmental situa-
tion, but to nurture an environmentally responsible economy.82 Cor-
porate responsibility molded under such an approach likely will be 
characterized by aggressive activities83 that surpass the reactive 
standards set by federal, state, and local governments. 
In theory, the Valdez Principles may be heralded as a new and 
aggressive approach to corporate environmental responsibility. Prac-
tically, however, the success of the Valdez Principles turns on 
whether a voluntary code can motivate corporations to shoulder a 
burden beyond what is legally required, and whether the disclosure 
and audit provisions of the Principles can be drafted in a manner to 
overcome present corporate objections. 
Corporate experience in South Africa under the Sullivan Principles 
indicates that a voluntary code of conduct, demanding responsibility 
beyond that legally required, may be successful if certain social and 
economic factors that motivate corporations to comply with the code 
of conduct are present. In addition, review of various techniques 
used in social audits suggests that the controversial disclosure and 
80 Valdez Principles, supra note 6; Feder, Who Will Subscribe to the Valdez Principle?, 
N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1989, § 3, at 6, col. l. 
81 Valdez Principles, supra note 6. Under the Valdez Principles, corporations take a pledge 
to "update [their] practices continually in light of advances in technology and new understand-
ings in health and environmental science . . . and make consistent measurable progress in 
implementing [the Principles]." [d. at l. 
82 Valdez Principles, supra note 6. 
83 For example, CERES intends that corporate signatories will strive to use the best 
available technology (BAT) in combatting environmental pollution from their facilities. Tele-
phone interview with Michael Fleming, CERES staff member (Jan. 11, 1991). This is currently 
required in only specific circumstances under the Clean Air Act, and not at all under most 
other environmental statutes. 
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audit standards may be structured in a manner acceptable to both 
the drafters and the potential signatories. 
A. Corporate Experience with Voluntary Codes of Conduct in 
South Africa: The Sullivan Principles 
In 1977, Reverend Leon H. Sullivan established the Sullivan Prin-
ciples in an effort to promote social justice and eliminate apartheid. 84 
These Principles are a voluntary code of conduct for American cor-
porations operating in South Africa. 85 The Sullivan Principles call 
for non-segregation of the workplace, equal employment practices, 
equal pay, development of training programs for the advancement 
of blacks and other nonwhites, increasing the number of blacks and 
other nonwhites in management positions, improving the quality of 
employees' lives outside the workplace, and working to eliminate 
laws that impede justice.86 Signatory companies are required an-
nually to release data on company performance.87 Using this infor-
mation, a consulting firm compiles and releases a public report com-
paring the performance of all signatory companies to a standard of 
socially responsible behavior. 88 
1. Success of the Sullivan Principles 
Since their inception in 1977, the Sullivan Principles have had a 
positive impact on apartheid,89 as well as on the attitudes of Amer-
ican corporations and investors. The Sullivan Principles have com-
84 D. HAUCK, M. VOORHES & G. GOLDBERG, Two DECADES OF DEBATE: THE CONTRO-
VERSY OVER U.S. COMPANIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 155-58 (1983) [hereinafter Two DECADES 
OF DEBATE]. 
85 See id. 
86 See J. LEAPE, B. BASKIN & S. UNDERHILL, BUSINESS IN THE SHADOW OF APARTHEID: 
U.S. FIRMS IN SOUTH AFRICA 217-18 (1985) [hereinafter BUSINESS IN THE SHADOW OF 
APARTHEID]; Going All-Out Against Apartheid, N. Y. Times, July 27, 1986, § 3, at 1, col. 2, 
27, col. 4. 
87 Two DECADES OF DEBATE, supra note 84, at 158. 
88 See ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC., TWELFTH REPORT ON THE SIGNATORY COMPANIES TO 
THE STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES FOR SOUTH AFRICA 4, 28-30 (1988) [hereinafter TWELFTH 
REPORT]. 
89 See BUSINESS IN THE SHADOW OF APARTHEID, supra note 86, at 221; N.Y. Times, June 
4, 1987, at D6, col. 1 (observation by Adrian Botha, South African Executive Director of the 
American Chamber of Commerce representing American companies operating in South Af-
rica). Reverend Sullivan also agrees that the Principles did show a notable record of corporate 
responsibility. Auerbach, Sullivan Abandoning S. African Code, Wash. Post, June 4, 1987, 
at El, col. 4, E4, col. 1. 
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batted apartheid by helping black South Africans gain workplace 
rights in numerous businesses and by helping black industrial labor 
unions win official recognition. 90 The Sullivan Principles influenced 
American corporations in South Africa by making them aware of 
injustices in the employment system,91 by providing a focus for 
company programs,92 and by unifying the companies to act as a group 
"sense of strength through numbers" as they confront social issues 
in South Africa. 93 Finally, the Sullivan Principles offer investors 
standards by which they can measure the social responsibility of 
American firms in South Africa94 and use such information to make 
moral determinations concerning their investments. 95 
American signatory corporations helped achieve progress 
against apartheid. Specific instances of progress are evident dur-
ing the first five years of operations under the Sullivan Prin-
ciples. 96 By 1982, only one of the reporting signatory companies 
had failed "to achieve complete, de facto non-segregation of 
their facilities. "97 Similarly, all but two signatory companies 
90 Going All-Out Against Apartheid, N. Y. Times, July 27, 1986, § 3, at 1, col. 2. 
91 Two DECADES OF DEBATE, supra note 84, at 120 (corporate executives agree that the 
Sullivan Principles have made them more aware of problems in South Africa and have forced 
them to pay more attention to their operations there); BUSINESS IN THE SHADOW OF APART-
HEID, supra note 86, at 135. 
92 D. MYERS, U.S. BUSINESS IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND MORAL 
ISSUES 97 (1980) [hereinafter U.S. BUSINESS IN SOUTH AFRICA]. Some company represen-
tatives characterize the Sullivan Principles as a catalyst that led companies to systematize 
programs for desegregation, training, and employee housing, and plan on a more systematic 
basis. [d. In addition, without the Sullivan Principles, corporate executives agreed that "they 
would not have established means of pooling information to enable each company to learn 
from the experience of others." Two DECADES OF DEBATE, supra note 84, at 120. 
93 Two DECADES OF DEBATE, supra note 84, at 120. According to one company executive 
interviewed by the Investor Responsibility Center, the Sullivan process made companies "less 
timid" about confronting social issues in South Africa because "acting in concert [is] easier 
than ... doing it all by yourself." [d. 
94 See Feder, A Wary Reception/or Sullivan Stand, N.Y. Times, June 8,1987, at D5, col. 
5. Many universities have incorporated corporate compliance with the Sullivan Principles into 
their overall investment policy. See U.S. BUSINESS IN SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 92, at 339. 
As of 1983, more than a dozen institutions-including Brandeis, Carleton, Cornell, the Uni-
versity of Kansas, Macalester, th~ University of Minnesota, Mount Holyoke, Oberlin, the 
University of Pennsylvania, Wellesley, Wesleyan, and Yale-adopted policies requiring that 
they not hold stock in companies that operated in South Africa and have declined to sign the 
Sullivan Principles. Two DECADES OF DEBATE, supra note 84, at 69. 
95 Feder, A Wary Reception/or Sullivan Stand, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1987, at D5, col. 5. 
96 Most advancements during these first years dealt with the first three Sullivan Principles, 
which called for desegregation, fair employment practices, and equal pay for equal work. Two 
DECADES OF DEBATE, supra note 84, at 118, 155-56. 
97 Two DECADES OF DEBATE, supra note 84, at 118 (citing ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC., 
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reported that all benefits available to whites were also available 
to employees of other races on an equal basis. 98 In addition, 
by 1982, all reporting companies were paying all races at the 
same rate for equal work and had been doing so for the past two 
years. 99 
Accomplishments of signatory companies in recent years reflect 
current progress. 100 During 1988 and 1989, signatory companies con-
tributed approximately sixty million dollars to socially responsible 
programs for minorities. 101 Contributions to education and training 
of minorities continued to rise, as evidenced by a thirteen percent 
increase in the number of bursaries102 and an eleven percent increase 
in Adopt-a-School grants. 103 The fostering of minority entrepreneurs 
continued, as reflected in recent increases of aid to minority business 
and in purchases from minority businesses. 104 The most striking 
evidence of progress, however, can be seen in the area of minority 
job advancement. The number of minorities filling job vacancies for 
managerial, supervisory, and professional positions has increased 
steadily in the past six years. 105 Notably, the number of whites 
supervised by minorities has risen marginally from 3.1% in 1983 to 
8.4% in 1989.106 
The statistics indicate that the Sullivan Principles continue to be 
a vehicle for positive change. More importantly, the Sullivan Prin-
ciples are a continuing source of guidance for American corporations 
SIXTH REPORT ON THE SIGNATORY COMPANIES TO THE SULLIVAN PRINCIPLES (October 31, 
1983». 
98 Id. 
99 I d. at 119. 
100 Since all signatories repeatedly have met the requirements of principles 1-3, TWELFTH 
REPORT, supra note 88, at 2, 5, most noteworthy progress has come in implementation of 
principles 4-7, which deal with education, training and advancement, community development 
and social justice. See ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC., THIRTEENTH REPORT ON THE SIGNATORY 
COMPANIES TO THE STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES FOR SOUTH AFRICA 9-31 (October 31, 1989) 
[hereinafter THIRTEENTH REPORT]; TWELFTH REPORT, supra note 88, at 7-27. 
101 See THIRTEENTH REPORT, supra note 100, at 1. Signatory companies contributed 169 
million rands, which, according to conversion rates in June 1989, equals approximately $60 
million. See TWELFTH REPORT, supra note 88, at 1; THIRTEENTH REPORT, supra note 100, 
at 8. 
102 See THIRTEENTH REPORT, supra note 100, at 1, 10. 
103 See TWELFTH REPORT, supra note 88, at 1, 8. 
104 See THIRTEENTH REPORT, supra note 100, at 1, 20-21; TWELFTH REPORT, supra note 
88, at 1, 18-19. Since 1983, purchases from minority businesses have risen a total of 260%. 
See THIRTEENTH REPORT, supra note 100, at 21; TWELFTH REPORT, supra note 88, at 19. 
105 See THIRTEENTH REPORT, supra note 100, at 16; TWELFTH REPORT, supra note 88, at 
15. 
106 See THIRTEENTH REPORT, supra note 100, at 15; TWELFTH REPORT, supra note 88, at 
13. 
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striving to be socially responsible amidst the racial oppression in 
South Africa. 
2. Social and Economic Pressures Behind the Success of the 
Sullivan Principles 
The success of the Sullivan Principles is largely a result of under-
lying social and economic pressures. For most corporations, the 
decision to adopt the Sullivan Principles was influenced heavily by 
the following social and economic pressures: increased media re-
porting; university hype and rising public interest concerning the 
role of business in South Africa;107 the need to improve corporate 
image and credibility with domestic groups;108 the growing number 
of shareholder resolutions calling for adoption of the Sullivan Prin-
ciples;109 and the growing use of the Sullivan Principles by investors 
as a measure for moral determinations regarding their investments. 110 
These same social and economic pressures continue to play a role 
in a corporation's decision to remain a signatory of the Principles. 
Many investors still use the Sullivan Principles as a yardstick for 
screening South African investments,111 and shareholders continue 
to raise South Africa-related resolutions. 112 
107 See U. S. BUSINESS IN SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 92, at 93-94. Media coverage of South 
Africa increased substantially in 1976. Id. at 93. Later in the 1970s, major publications included 
articles on American business involvement in South Africa, and interest among the American 
public, particularly among college students, remained high. Id. Companies thought the Sul-
livan Principles would meet the public's demand for information through releasing social audits 
and publicizing company efforts in South Africa. See Two DECADES OF DEBATE, supra note 
84, at 104. 
108 Two DECADES OF DEBATE, supra note 84, at 104. 
109 BUSINESS IN THE SHADOW OF APARTHEID, supra note 86, at xxxi. Shareholder reso-
lutions in support of the Sullivan Principles were successful for several reasons: first, managers 
were prepared to pay some price, such as a large contribution to South Africa, to avoid 
embarrassing disruptions at annual meetings and the high cost of management time in fighting 
these resolutions; second, shareholder resolutions focused American managers on opportuni-
ties to adopt policies beneficial to both the managers and Black South Africans; and third, 
large institutional investors adopted policies that limited investment in securities of firms with 
South African operations. Id. 
110 See U.S. BUSINESS IN SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 92, Appendix E, at 339; Feder, A 
Wary Reception for Sullivan Stand, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1987, at D5, col. 5. 
111 See Two DECADES OF DEBATE, supra note 84, at 121. One commentator has noted that 
the "institutional investors and others have made it clear that they expect companies operating 
in South Africa to sign and implement the Sullivan [Pjrinciples as a minimum social respon-
sibility requirement and undoubtedly would scrutinize closely any company that withdrew 
from the [Pjrinciples." Id. 
112 Id. at 62. Although the South African-related shareholder resolutions peaked in 1980 
with 38, and they have decreased somewhat since then, shareholder resolutions remain influ-
ential in company decisionmaking. Id. 
478 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 18:457 
3. Reverend Sullivan's Abandonment of the Principles in 1987 
Driven by social and economic forces, the Sullivan Principles thus 
far have been successful. Reverend Sullivan's withdrawal of his 
support for the Principles in June 1987 after calling on American 
companies to divest from South Africa113 and the subsequent divest-
ing by many American companies114 should not change this charac-
terization. 
Reverend Sullivan abandoned the Principles because he felt that 
they had failed to bring about the end of apartheid and that it was 
time for more drastic action. 115 Sullivan's action, however, does not 
indicate that the Principles were a failure. Sullivan himself acknowl-
edged that the Principles alone could not end apartheid. 116 They 
were one of many forces that, if combined, would bring about the 
end of apartheid. 117 Therefore, the fact that apartheid had not been 
abolished by Sullivan's self-imposed deadline of June 1987 means not 
that the Principles truly failed, but that they, along with other 
forces, failed to keep pace with Sullivan's own expectations. In ad-
dition, many companies in South Africa that did not divest still 
adhere to the Principles and have made progress in combatting 
apartheid. 118 Such progress is an indication of the continuing success 
of the Sullivan Principles. 
American corporations divesting from South Africa is not an in-
dication of any shortcoming of the Sullivan Principles. On the con-
113 See Auerbach, Sullivan Abandons S. African Code, Wash. Post, June 4, 1987, at E1, 
col. 4; Battersby, South Africa Reacts Angrily to Sullivan Call, N.Y. Times, June 4, 1987, 
at D6, col. 1. 
114 A total of 136 firms divested from South Africa between 1984 and June 17, 1987. 
Swardson, Officials Deny Pressure Led to Bank Divestiture: Citicorp Is the 136th U.S. Firm 
to Leave Nation, Wash. Post, June 17, 1987, at F1, col. 5. As of October 31, 1989, a total of 
59 American signatories to the Sullivan Principles remain in South Africa, as compared with 
the 92 that remained at the close of 1987. See THIRTEENTH REPORT, supra note 100, at 5. 
115 See Potts & Skrzycki Many Companies Reject Call to Leave, Wash. Post, June 4, 1987, 
at E1, col. 2. Sullivan did note, however, that "the Principles have caused a revolution in 
industrial race relations in South Africa." Id. 
116 Two DECADES OF DEBATE, supra note 84, at 102. 
117 Id. 
118 See generally THIRTEENTH REPORT, supra note 100; TWELFTH REPORT, supra note 88; 
Potts & Skrzycki Many Companies Reject Call to Leave, Wash. Post, June 4, 1987, at E1, 
col. 2 (companies will stay in South Africa because they find it difficult to conclude that 
continuing to help blacks there is counterproductive); Feder, Sullivan Asks End of Business 
Links with South Africa, N. Y. Times, June 4, 1987, at AI, col. 1 (business groups say that 
companies' continued presence in South Africa remains the best hope for social change); 
Battersby, South Africa Reacts Angrily to Sullivan Call, N.Y. Times, June 4, 1987, at D6, 
col. 1 (U.S. companies will continue with the Sullivan program and not tum off the tap on 
social responsibility). 
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trary, such divesting was a tribute to the success of the Principles 
and the forces behind them. The Sullivan Principles focused share-
holders, investors, and the American public on the ways in which 
social and economic pressures can be mobilized to influence corporate 
social responsibility.119 Thus, when much of the investing public and 
Reverend Sullivan decided that, to be socially responsible, American 
corporations should divest, not comply with the Sullivan Principles, 
these same social and economic forces were used successfully as 
weapons to achieve such divesting. 120 
The fact that the corporate divesting was so widespread is an 
exciting prospect for the Valdez Principles. In the future, whether 
social and economic pressures are used to back a formal voluntary 
code of conduct such as the Sullivan Principles or an informal policy 
such as divesting, one may expect the outcome to be similarly suc-
cessful. 
B. External Forces Likely to Influence Corporate Response to the 
Valdez Principles 
The social and economic strategies used by activists to pressure 
corporate behavior in South Africa have been characterized as a 
"basic blueprint" that will be influential in steering corporate per-
formance in other social responsibility campaigns. 121 The growing 
119 See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text. 
120 Social pressure in the form of concern for company image and the mounting activist 
campaign against corporate involvement in South Africa were cited among the reasons given 
for corporate pUllout. Risen, G.M. to Pull Out of South Africa, L.A. Times, Oct. 21, 1986, 
pt. 1, at 14, col. 1; Kristof, U.S. Companies Cut Some South African Links, N. Y. Times, 
Apr. 29, 1985, at AI, col. 3, D8, col. 3. Economic pressures were considered the main force 
behind divestiture. Isikoff, Threat to Profits Spurs U.S. Exodus from South Africa, Wash. 
Post, Nov. 17, 1986, at 1, col. 1. Divestiture by shareholder public institutions, including 
colleges, universities, and state and local governments, was considered one particularly influ-
ential economic tactic. [d. at A20, col. 2. According to tabulations at the height of divestiture, 
116 colleges and universities, 19 state governments, and 83 cities and counties had passed 
anti-South African measures requiring the sale of $22 billion worth of securities in United 
States corporations and banks involved in South Africa. [d. The divestiture of California state 
securities alone required the sale of $9.5 billion in state securities. [d. The passage of "selective 
purchasing laws" that restricted public contracts to the United States companies involved in 
South Africa was considered the other economic tactic influential in spurring firms to pull out 
of South Africa. [d. at A20, col. 3. By November of 1986, two state governments (Maryland 
and Michigan) and 31 cities and counties (including Los Angeles, N ew York, and the District 
of Columbia) had passed selective contracting laws. [d. This form of economic pressure was 
thought to be the most severe because American corporations lost business in the United 
States based on the fact that they were doing business in South Africa. [d. 
121 [d. at A20, col. 1 (observation made by Tim Smith, executive director of the Interfaith 
Center on Corporate Responsibility). 
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influence of these "blueprint" strategies in contexts other than 
Apartheid indicates that they are capable of warming corporate 
reception of the Valdez Principles, just as they motivated acceptance 
of, and compliance with, the Sullivan Principles in South Africa. 
1. Social Pressures 
Media pressure will be influential in gaining corporate support for 
the Valdez Principles. In any given week, hardly a day goes by when 
the public is not reminded of pressing environmental concerns such 
as toxic emissions, ocean dumping, waste disposal, and chemical 
spills.122 Extensive public awareness of environmental issues will 
increase the pressure on corporations to sign on to the Valdez Prin-
ciples. Support of the Valdez Principles ultimately will help reduce 
public criticism that firms are not environmentally conscious and will 
help corporations maintain a positive public image. 123 
Strong public interest was essential to the social movement that 
pressured corporations operating in South Africa to comply with the 
Sullivan Principles and ultimately divest. Public interest is likely to 
be much more significant in galvanizing support for increased cor-
porate environmental responsibility because, unlike the social prob-
lems in South Africa, environmental problems in the United States 
are not miles away, but in our own backyard. 124 Notably, strong 
public uprising was evident in response to the Exxon Valdez oil 
spill. 125 Consumers boycotted Exxon oil stations and sent back Exxon 
122 An informal survey of the New York Times during four consecutive days in November 
1989 reflects the abundance of articles dealing with environmental issues. See Schneider, U.S. 
Seeks to Store Nuclear Waste at Army Bases to Save Plutonium Plant, N.Y. Times, Nov. 
10, 1989, at A27, col. 1; Wald, Tritium Released at a Weapons Lab, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 
1989, at A30, col. 1; Gold, House Passes Amendment on Spill Liability, N. Y. Times, Nov. 9, 
1989, at A32, col. 1; Lewis, Thatcher Urges Pact on Climate, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1989, at 
A17, col. 1; James, New Jersey Towns Face a Fall Compost Crisis, N. Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1989, 
at B2, col. 4; Cushman, New Rules Sought on Shipping Toxic Material, N. Y. Times, Nov. 8, 
1989, at A20, col. 1; Montgomery, U.S., Japan and Soviets Prevent Accord to Limit Carbon 
Dioxide, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1989, at A8, col. 3; Hanley, New Jersey Questions Superfund 
Priority, N. Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1989, at B1, col. 2. 
123 Support of the Sullivan Principles brought such advantages to American companies in 
South Africa. BUSINESS IN THE SHADOW OF APARTHEID, supra note 86, at 221; U.S. BUSINESS 
IN SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 92, at 94. 
124 McPherson, Ethical Investing, WILLAMETTE WEEK, Aug. 24, 1989, at 14, 15. 
125 The activist group Citizens for Environmental Responsibility was formed in response to 
the Valdez spill. Citizens for Environmental Responsibility Urges Consumers to Boycott 
Exxon, Business Wire, Apr. 18, 1989 (available on NEXIS, Wires file). One member recalls 
that the idea for the group began simultaneously in many parts of the country as if the "oil 
spill touched a nerve and triggered an instant network of people." I d. 
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credit cards. 126 Such consumer action is clear evidence of public 
concern with environmental issues. 
2. Economic Pressures 
Economic pressures were cited by financial analysts and corporate 
management as the real reason that corporations initially complied 
with the Sullivan Principles127 and later chose to divest. 128 While 
currently the environmental context contains no parallels to the 
South African selective contracting laws, socially responsible inves-
tors and shareholders are exerting on corporations significant pres-
sures to be environmentally responsible. 129 In the environmental 
context, the parallel to corporate divestiture-the move by public 
institutions to sell securities of companies with South African ties-
appears to be socially responsible investing. The socially responsible 
investor purchases securities and products only in firms that meet 
positive criteria, such as environmental sensitivity and delivery of 
safe products and services; such an investor also screens corporations 
to avoid investing in firms that meet negative criteria, such as weap-
ons manufacturing. 130 Socially responsible investing began in the 
1920s when religious institutions began purging portfolios of "sin 
stocks" and weapons manufacturers. 131 Today, $450 billion is invested 
based on social criteria, and there are currently a dozen socially 
126 White, 10,000 Angry Credit Card Holders Deluge Exxon with Plastic, L.A. Times, May 
2, 1989, pt. IV, at 1, col. 5. While the returned cards represented only one-seventh of one 
percent of Exxon's 7 million credit cards, Exxon was concerned sufficiently about the devel-
opment to issue statements pleading its side of the case. Id. 
127 See N. MAKGELTA & A. SEIDMAN, OUTPOSTS OF MONOPOLY CAPITALISM: SOUTHERN 
AFRICA IN THE CHANGING GLOBAL ECONOMY 73 (1980). Corporations signed the Sullivan 
Principles in an effort to convince the public that they, the corporations, should be encouraged 
to remain and even expand their holdings in South Africa. Id. 
128 In numerous newspaper articles covering corporate divestment from South Africa, the 
threat to corporate profit was cited as the main reason for leaving. See, e.g., Isikoff, Threat 
to Profits Spurs U.S. Exodus from South Africa, Wash. Post, Nov. 17, 1986, at AI, col. 1; 
Risen, G.M. to Pull out of South Africa, L.A. Times, Oct. 21, 1986, pt. I, at 14, col. 1 (G.M. 
cites losses and deterioration of the South African economy as factors in pullout decision); 
Kristof, U.S. Companies Cut Some South African Links, N.Y. Times, Apr. 29,1985, at AI, 
col. 3 (American companies deciding to scale back or sell off operations in South Africa publicly 
cite declining profitability of South African operations); Claiborne, Citicorp to Sell S. African 
Subsidiary, Wash. Post, June 17, 1987, at F1, col. 2 (Citibank pulls out as South African 
connection had become unprofitable and was directly affecting the company's bottom line). 
129 See McPherson, supra note 124, at 14. 
130 See id. 
131 See id. at 15. 
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responsible investment funds that specialize in this area. 132 This 
represents over a ten-fold increase in this industry since 1985. 133 
Socially responsible investing could play a large role in fostering 
corporate environmental responsibility. First, the $450 billion in-
vested annually according to socially responsible criteria is more 
than twenty times greater than the $22 billion divested from firms 
operating in South Africa; the preference given to socially respon-
sible firms was crucial to the decision by firms operating in South 
Africa to pull out of South Africa. 134 If environmental concerns be-
come a focus of socially responsible investing, instead of being one 
of many criteria,135 firms would feel the economic pressure directly 
and would consequently act in a more environmentally responsible 
manner.136 Second, socially responsible investing recently has be-
come a competitive alternative to investing in firms without social 
criteria screens. 137 Responsible investors no longer have to sacrifice 
profit to invest according to socially responsible ideals. Third, fund 
managers expect socially responsible environmental investing to 
make a dramatic leap forward in future years for two reasons: the 
environment is the predicted hot topic of the 1990s;138 and, because 
the environment is in everyone's backyard, it is increasingly a con-
cern of the entire investing public. 139 
Socially responsible investment funds and other private investors 
will begin to screen clients according to compliance with the Valdez 
Principles. This will mirror the activity in the early 1980s, when 
screening for compliance with the Sullivan Principles was a popular 
132 See id. 
133 Id. at 14. 
134 Isikoff, Threat to Profits Spurs U.S. Exodus fmm South Africa, Wash. Post, Nov. 17, 
1986, at 1, col. 1, A20, col. 3. 
135 Socially responsible investment funds already screen investments for environmental 
responsibility. See Kirkpatrick, Environmentalism: The New Crusade, FORTUNE, Feb. 12, 
1990, at 44, 47. It is likely that these funds will adopt compliance with the Valdez Principles 
as one criterion in the environmental screening process because many social investment funds 
already are members of CERES. See Valdez Principles, supra note 6, Statement of Intent. 
136 CERES already has organized a broad coalition of environmentalists and investment 
professionals, together representing more than $100 billion in assets, that is calling for cor-
porations to be more environmentally responsible. Davidson, SIF Announces Valdez Princi-
ples with $150 B Worth of Backers, Wide Press Coverage, FORUM, THE NEWSLETTER OF THE 
SOCIAL INVESTMENT FORUM, Winter 1989, at 1, 4. 
m See Wiles, Mutual Funds: Putting Your Money Where Your Morals Are, L.A. Times, 
Oct. 14, 1990, at D5, col. l. 
138 Kirkpatrick, supra note 135, at 44. 
139 McPherson, supra note 123, at 15. 
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amendment to the investment policy of many universities and in-
vestment funds. 140 
Shareholder influence in the form of voting strategies and share-
holder resolutions are a second source of economic pressure on cor-
porations to become more environmentally responsible. 141 The po-
tential of this influence was demonstrated in the recent activities of 
the New York City pension fund. In May of 1989, the New York 
City Employee Retirement System (NYCERS) successfully threat-
ened to withhold its votes from management candidates unless man-
agement acted in a manner that NYCERS felt was environmentally 
responsible. 142 If such activism spreads to other funds and institu-
tional investors, large block shareholders such as NYCERS may 
become a driving force behind corporate environmental responsibil-
ity.143 
Like shareholder voting, shareholder resolutions calling for cor-
porate adoption of the Valdez Principles may exert economic pres-
sure for corporations to be environmentally responsible. Resolutions 
in support of the Valdez Principles, like resolutions in support of the 
Sullivan Principles, may be successful on economic grounds. 144 
First, corporate managers may be prepared to pay some price, 
such as compliance with the environmental provisions of the Valdez 
Principles, to avoid embarrassing disruptions of annual meetings and 
the high cost of management time associated with fighting such 
resolutions. The shareholder aggravation factor was very effec-
140 See U.S. BUSINESS IN SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 92, at app. E. For example, Amherst 
College adopted a South African related investment policy in 1977 whereby the college would 
consider selective divestment of stock in companies that fail to carry out the goals of the 
Sullivan Principles. Id. 
141 Nichols, Pension Funds Plan New Forays into Oil Companies' Board Rooms, PLATT'S 
OILGRAM NEWS, June 5, 1989, at 5. 
142 Id. By coupling a threat to withhold their votes from management candidates with a 
massive campaign in the media, NYCERS pressured Exxon to appoint an environmentalist 
to the board and create a committee to deal with environmental issues. Id. NYCERS holds 
shares in other major oil companies such as Chevron, Mobil, Amoco, Occidental, Phillips 
Petroleum, and Unocal, and thus has the potential to pressure for environmentally responsible 
activities by these companies as well. Id. 
143 The push for activism by large block shareholders may already be in motion. Prominent 
individuals such as Harrison J. Goldin and Gray Davis, the comptrollers of New York City 
and the State of California respectively, have made public statements supporting aggressive 
corporate environmental responsibility. See Statement by California Comptroller Gray Davis, 
Sept. 7, 1989 [hereinafter Statement by Davis); Remarks by New York City Comptroller 
Harrison J. Goldin, Statement on the Establishment of the Valdez Principles, Sept. 7, 1989 
[hereinafter Remarks by Goldin]. 
144 See supra note 109. 
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tive in extracting some form of appeasement from managers of com-
panies with South African operations. 145 Managers often made 
especially large contributions to South African community develop-
ment in an effort to avoid the shareholder criticisms. 146 It is not 
unreasonable to suggest that managers would make a similar en-
vironmental contribution, by signing on to an acceptable form 
of the Valdez Principles, to avoid shareholder dissatisfaction and 
protest. 
Second, acceptance of the Valdez Principles may be mutually ben-
eficial to management interests and the environmental interests that 
shareholders are trying to protect. The Principles may benefit man-
agement by focusing and systematizing management's approach 
to environmentally sensitive operations,147 by providing manage-
ment with the added safety of "working in numbers" with other sig-
natories to change the way industry views environmental responsi-
bility,148 by improving company image and credibility to attract 
and keep investor capital,149 and by potentially strengthening com-
petitive position in world markets. 15o Third, acceptance of the 
Valdez Principles will help ensure that the corporation will not 
lose investments from socially responsible investment and pension 
funds. 151 
145 BUSINESS IN THE SHADOW OF APARTHEID, supra note 86, at xxxi. 
146 ld. 
147 Corporate executives noted that the Sullivan Principles had a measurable impact on 
company operations by helping signatories systematize current programs to help underprivi-
leged South Africans and systematize plans for future programs. U.S. BUSINESS IN SOUTH 
AFRICA, supra note 92, at 97. Similarly, the Valdez Principles may help systematize a com-
pany's current and future plans in the area of environmental responsibility. This would lead 
to greater efficiency and some cost savings for management. 
148 Executives stressed that the Sullivan Principles gave companies a sense of "strength in 
numbers" in confronting issues in South Africa. Two DECADES OF DEBATE, supra note 84, 
at 120. While this was viewed as a moral support for companies attacking apartheid, it also 
may be viewed as an economic support for companies attacking environmental issues. Engag-
ing in aggressive corporate responsibility will be costly for companies. The fact that compet-
itors in the industry are also signatories and are also figuring this cost into profits will be 
somewhat of a relief for managers of Valdez signatories. 
149 See Two DECADES OF DEBATE, supra note 84, at 104. 
150 See Bavaria, Business, Clean Up Your Environmental Act!, Newsday, Sept. 7, 1989, 
at 77, col. 2. 3M Corporation's decision to institute its "Pollution Prevention Pays" program 
was equally beneficial to the corporation and to the environment. The program has advanced 
3M's technology, strengthened its competitive position in world markets, and" saved $235 
million. [d. The program also saved the environment from 100,000 tons of air pollutants, 
10,000 tons of water pollutants, 150,000 tons of sludge, and 1.5 billion gallons of wastewater. 
[d. 
151 See supra note 135. 
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C. Structuring Disclosure and Audit Provisions for the Valdez 
Principles 
The social and economic atmosphere seems ripe for fostering a 
voluntary code of environmental conduct. Nevertheless, before the 
business community will accept the Valdez Principles, CERES must 
overcome specific objections that potential signatories have voiced 
with regard to the audit and disclosure provisions. Review of the 
federal disclosure standards, as well as various techniques used in 
social audits and internal corporate audits, suggests that these pro-
visions may be structured in a manner that will preserve CERES's 
goals and pacify corporate objections. 
The disclosure provision, as it presently reads, would require each 
signatory company to: 
disclos[e] to [its] employees and to the public incidents relating 
to [its] operations that cause environmental harm or pose health· 
or safety hazards, ... disclose potential environmental, health 
or safety hazards posed by [its] operations, and ... not take any 
action against employees who report any condition that creates 
a danger to the environment or poses health and safety haz-
ards. 152 
This provision is intended to elicit disclosure of all incidents, as 
opposed to the periodic disclosures required under the audit provi-
sion. 153 
Potential signatories to the Valdez Principles have voiced two 
major objections to the proposed disclosure provision. First, corpo-
rate sources argue that such a broad disclosure policy will lead to 
increased litigation against their companies. l54 Second, corporate 
sources note that it would be difficult to agree to a disclosure policy 
that might create disclosure liability beyond that specified in state 
and local law. 155 In other words, potential signatories view the dis-
closure provision as requiring corporations voluntarily to open a 
Pandora's box, which may result in costly litigation accompanied by 
civil and criminal penalties. Finally, there is concern that the broad 
disclosure provision will cause confidentiality problems. 156 
152 Valdez Principles, supra note 6, at 2. 
153 Telephone interview with Michael Fleming, CERES Staff Member (Jan. 11, 1991). 
154 Feder, Who Will Subscribe to the Valdez Principles?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1989, § 3, 
at 6, col. 1. 
155 [d. 
156 See Zoll, Changing Corporate Conduct-Two Perspectives, ENVTL. F., Mar.lApr. 1990, 
at 33,45. 
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The disclosure provision in its present form is not acceptable. Few 
signatories will expose themselves voluntarily to the increased costs 
that likely would stem from compliance with the proposed provision. 
In addition, few signatories will release information regarding poli-
cies on disclosure of accidents and hazard assessments unless safe-
guards exist to protect the proprietary nature of such information. 
An acceptable disclosure provision must strike a compromise be-
tween CERES's goals and the practical concerns of the potential 
signatories. CERES would like disclosure under the Valdez Princi-
ples to help investors make informed decisions about environmental 
issues;157 signatories, on the other hand, are concerned primarily 
with bottom line financial issues and confidentiality concerns. 158 
Accordingly, a compromise disclosure provision requires that, 
first, signatories disclose, at a minimum, all information previously 
required to be disclosed by law. Thereafter, additional disclosure 
may be dictated by the degree to which social and economic pres-
sures behind the Valdez Principles influence corporate policy.159 As 
such, CERES achieves its goal of providing a useful source of en-
vironmental information for investors while signatories incur no sub-
stantial additional cost in making this disclosure. 16o Furthermore, 
CERES sets a reasonable and attainable disclosure standard, one 
that neither will recruit potential signatories, nor will turn them 
away. 161 
1. Tying Disclosure to Legal Standards 
Federal regulations already require extensive disclosure of a com-
pany's production of hazardous chemicals or any chemical spills or 
releases. Accordingly, a disclosure provision that initially mimics the 
federal disclosure standards would provide a high base line for dis-
closure, would not be burdensome for signatories, and would not 
compromise CERES's goals. 
157 Telephone interview with Michael Fleming, CERES Staff Member (Jan. 11, 1991). 
158 See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text. 
159 See supra text accompanying notes 122-51. 
160 The additional cost for signatories would be the cost of becoming a signatory and 
thereafter any cost in compiling its previously released disclosure. See infra note 180 and 
accompanying text. 
161 See Comment, The Valdez Principles: Is What's Good for America Good for General 
Motors?, 8 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 180, 195 (1990). The author notes that "[clorporations will 
not sign a code whose standards are too stiff. By establishing reasonable benchmarks, first 
organizers can recruit more companies. Once the companies are on board, organizers can 
gradually increase the stringency of the standards. Most companies will be reluctant to 
abandon the code once they have publicly signed." Id. 
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Specifically, under the federal laws, when reportable quantities of 
hazardous substances are released into the environment, the Na-
tional Response Center in Washington must be notified immedi-
at ely. 162 When extremely hazardous substances are released into the 
environment and pose a risk to those outside the bounds of the 
facility, predesignated community emergency coordinators for the 
area affected by the release must be notified at once. 163 
In addition, when industry uses potentially harmful chemicals in 
a community, the Community Right-to-Know regulations require 
corporations to provide the public with important information on the 
hazardous and toxic substances located in, and released by, corporate 
facilities within the community.164 With regard to hazardous sub-
stances, owners and operators of a facility must submit to the com-
mittees, commissions, and fire departments that have jurisdiction 
over the facility a material safety data sheet165 and an inventory 
form for each hazardous chemical present at the facility. 166 The public 
generally has access to the information provided in these reports. 167 
With regard to toxic chemicals that have been manufactured, pro-
cessed, or otherwise used in excess of the predetermined threshold 
quantity, owners and operators of facilities must submit a report to 
the EPA and the state where the facility is located. 168 
Use of this federal disclosure standard initially is consistent with 
the notion that the Valdez Principles should not be "weapons of 
coercion, "169 but a "starting point from which corporations can . . . 
develop a workable approach to environmentally responsible corpo-
lG2 Designation, Reportable Quantities, and Notification, 40 C.F.R. § 302.6 (1990). 
1"" Emergency Planning and Notification, 40 C.F.R. § 355.40 (1989). Owners and operators 
in this situation are required to disclose: the identity of the substance involved in the release, 
an indication of its hazardous nature, an estimate of the quantity released, the duration of the 
release, the media into which the release occurred, and any anticipated acute or chronic health 
risks associated with the release. Id. 
Hi4 See Hazardous Chemical Reporting: Community Right-to-Know, 40 C.F.R. § 370 (1989); 
Toxic Chemical Release Reporting: Community Right-to-Know, 40 C.F.R. § 372 (1989). 
loG "Material safety data sheets" are data sheets containing information on hazardous 
chemicals; facilities must prepare the material safety data sheets pursuant to the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988), and regulations promulgated 
under that Act. 40 C. F. R. § 370.20(a) (1989). 
W6 Id. § 370.21. 
IH7 See id. §§ 370.30-.31. 
1G8 40 C.F.R. § 372.30 (1989). For purposes of this section, "toxic chemicals" refers to toxic 
chemicals as defined under § 313 of title III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization 
Act of 1986. I d. § 372.1. Requirements for the submission of information relating to the release 
of toxic chemicals are set forth in 40 C.F.R. § 372 (1989). 
169 See Remarks by Goldin, supra note 143, at 3. 
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rate policy making. "170 CERES need not force a corporation to accept 
a broad and potentially costly disclosure policy prior to signing on 
to the Valdez Principles. Signing on is the "starting point." There-
after, corporations voluntarily will develop a stricter and potentially 
more costly disclosure standard, as warranted by evolving economic 
and societal pressures. 171 
2. Providing for Greater Public Access to Information 
CERES should accept the limited disclosure provision suggested 
above. However, to realize CERES's goal that the disclosure be 
helpful to investors, it would be useful to structure a disclosure 
provision that contains a mechanism for wider dissemination of dis-
closed information. The mechanism could be suspended if wider 
dissemination would incur substantial additional cost. 172 
An acceptable disclosure mechanism would make reported infor-
mation more available to the investing public in a useful, yet inex-
pensive form. Ideally, such a disclosure mechanism would provide 
for a centralized repository of disclosed information, classified by 
company, that is easily accessible to the public. This may be accom-
plished by linking the disclosed environmental information to one of 
the financial reporting services-such as Dun & Bradstreet, Stan-
dard & Poors, or Value Line-that already publishes financial anal-
yses on individual companies periodically.173 The reporting group 
could develop a separate environmental reporting service, similar to 
existing financial reporting services, that would publish compilations 
of disclosed environmental information on a frequent basis. 174 The 
170 [d. 
171 Similarly, the Sullivan Principles were the "starting point" for corporate social respon-
sibility in South Africa. As social and economic pressures pushed for corporate responsibility 
beyond mere adherence to the Sullivan Principles, corporations switched gears and complied. 
The same potential exists for social and economic pressure to influence the course of environ-
mental responsibility under which the Valdez Principles exist. See supra notes 122-51 and 
accompanying text. 
172 Cost was a large factor in corporation opposition to the disclosure provisions. See Feder, 
Who Will Subscribe to the Valdez Principles?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1989, § 3, at 6, col. 1. 
Cost likely will be a large factor in determining whether such a consolidated mechanism for 
disclosure ultimately is accepted. 
173 These financial reporting services compile and publish financial and management analyses 
on the companies at varying degrees of frequency. Some provide quarterly reports, some 
monthly reports, and others provide a daily newswire of information. 
174 Clearly, to be useful to investors and achieve CERES disclosure goals, this information 
must be published more frequently than an annual audit. However, due to the cost of compiling 
and printing such material, it is likely that a monthly release would be an appropriate 
compromise. 
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reporting group also could develop a news service that investors 
could contact by telephone or modem to access information disclosed 
to government or community sources. 
Under each of these scenarios, as with financial reporting services, 
companies and investors would share the cost of compiling and dis-
seminating the disclosed information. 175 Companies would pay a fee 
to subscribe to the service, and investors would pay a fee to access 
the compiled information. In terms of cost, a telephone or news 
service probably would be the best option because it would avoid 
the printing and setup cost that would be incurred in using either 
an existing or a new printed reporting service. 
According to the 1990 CERES Guide to the Valdez Principles,176 
CERES intends to disseminate a CERES Report annually for each 
signatory. Each Report, which will be prepared by the signatory, 
will discuss the company's progress in meeting the requirements of 
the Valdez Principles. 177 At present, the section of the Report relat-
ing to disclosure requires each signatory to present a narrative 
discussion on, among other things: 
-the [signatory's] policy regarding disclosure of accidents and 
incidents at company facilities that may cause environmental 
harm or pose hazards to worker or public health and safety [and] 
-[h]ow ... the [signatory] systematically share[s] hazard as-
sessment documents with workers, state and local officials, and 
community leaders. 178 
While such a Report would provide the necessary mechanism for 
wider dissemination of disclosed information to the public, it has 
several limitations. 
Annual distribution of the CERES Report on each signatory will 
not provide investors with a continual and updated source of infor-
mation. A monthly service or a telephone or modem service would 
provide investors with more current information. In addition, the 
175 Sharing the cost between the companies and interested investors is standard among the 
existing financial analysis reporting services that currently exist. 
176 CERES, THE 1990 CERES GUIDE TO THE VALDEZ PRINCIPLES 11 [hereinafter THE 
1990 CERES GUIDE). 
177 Id. 
178 Id. at 15. Additionally, more detailed questions will be developed be CERES in consul-
tation with a Corporate Advisory Committee comprised of signatory companies. Id. at 12. 
The requirements set forth in the 1990 CERES Guide are consistent with CERES's objective 
of providing signatories with an opportunity to describe the means they have used for com-
pliance with the disclosure provisions. Id. at 11. In addition, if a signatory feels that a 
particular disclosure question does not apply to its business, the signatory may explain why 
in the CERES Report. Id. 
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questions in the CERES Report currently focus on environmental 
policy and procedure, and omit any compilation of disclosures made 
to governmental and community sources. 
If the scope and distribution limitations are overcome, the CERES 
Report can function as an effective mechanism for disclosure. The 
narrative format of the Report minimizes confidentiality concerns. 179 
Furthermore, the cost to signatory companies for compilation and 
dissemination of the CERES Report is essentially the annual fee 
required of all signatories to the Valdez Principles,180 not an addi-
tional cost such as those that would be associated with several of 
the alternative disclosure mechanisms discussed above. 
3. Confidentiality Concerns 
Any compilation service that merely reports information that sig-
natories already have disclosed to various governmental and com-
munity sources, as required by law, will not raise any new confiden-
tiality concerns. However, confidentiality concerns will arise if the 
compilation also reports signatories' policies on, for example, disclo-
sure of accidents and hazard assessments. 181 Signatories' policies, 
while of interest to investors and investment managers, may contain 
proprietary information. Accordingly, to avoid friction, signatories 
should be allowed to review any compilation containing information 
179 Because the disclosure of company policy toward reporting of environmental accidents 
and hazard assessments is structured as a narrative, signatories have control over which 
information is included in the CERES Report and may avoid releasing proprietary information. 
THE 1990 CERES GUIDE, supra note 176, at 11, 15. In addition, because any summaries of 
a signatory's CERES Report highlighting information for investors will be shown to signa-
tories for comment before they are made public, signatories can clarify any misinterpretation 
on the part of CERES regarding information in the CERES Report prior to its release to the 
public. 
180 See THE 1990 CERES GUIDE, supra note 176, at 21. To help defray costs to CERES 
for establishing and maintaining lists of signatory companies, preparing and distributing the 
annual CERES Report, and disseminating information obtained in the Reports, CERES will 
require signatory companies to pay a fee in proportion to their size. Id. 
Companies that become signatories in 1990 will pay a first-year fee scaled according to 
world-wide gross revenues. For example, the fee for companies with revenues of less that $5 
million is $100, and the fee for companies with revenues of greater than $10 billion is $15 
thousand. Id. Beginning in 1991, CERES will charge signatories annual fees according to the 
costs of managing and disseminating data. I d. The maximum fee will not exceed $15 thousand. 
Id. In the future, signatory companies likely will incur an additional fee to pay for certification 
of answers in the CERES Report by outside parties, because it is anticipated that this 
eventually will be required by CERES. See id. at 12. 
lHl CERES intends to include such disclosure in the CERES Report. See id. at 15. Ac-
cordingly, other mechanisms for disclosure may seek to include such information. 
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on company disclosure policies and remove any proprietary infor-
mation prior to its release to the public. 182 
4. The Audit Provision 
The audit provision, as it presently reads, would require each 
signatory corporation: 
[to] conduct and make public an annual self-evaluation of [its] 
progress in implementing these Principles and in complying with 
all applicable laws and regulations throughout [the corporation's] 
worldwide operations [and to] work toward the timely creation 
of independent environmental audit procedures which [it] will 
complete annually and make available to the public. 183 
CERES envisions that this provision eventually will require a com-
prehensive environmental audit with examination standards much 
like those that the Financial Accounting Standards Board (F ASB) 
has developed for financial audits. 184 Further, CERES intends that 
the audit be far more sweeping than environmental audits currently 
done by lenders and purchasers of real estate. 185 
Corporate sources and environmental advisors to the business 
community have objected to the proposed audit provision on several 
grounds. First, any environmental audit comparable to a financial 
audit is likely to be circumspect, providing coalition members with 
less information than they anticipate. 186 Second, environmental au-
diting is "simply too diverse and fluid" to support an approach as 
182 CERES has adopted this policy in the CERES Report. See supra note 179 and accom-
panying text. Any other disclosure method adopted also should incorporate this safeguard. 
1X3 Valdez Principles, supra note 6, at 2. 
184 N. Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1989, § 3, at 6, col. 6. 
185 Id. For example, a comprehensive environmental audit of company operations and 
company real estate requires evaluation of compliance with all relevant federal, state, and 
foreign laws and regulations. This process potentially would entail using checklists and ques-
tionnaires to evaluate compliance at each of the corporations' manufacturing plants and facil-
ities; reviewing workers compensation "loss runs" to evaluate pollution and health problems; 
making periodic visits to facilities to review compliance efforts; checking that each waste 
disposal contractor used by the corporation has its own pollution liability insurance and 
certificate of insurance; making sure that all underground storage management systems are 
in place; evaluating the history of all real estate owned by the corporation, such as checking 
chain of title, the status of any cleanup liens, and the National Priorities List; and performing 
a site inspection and evaluating the likely path of pollutants on any real estate owned. 
Finlayson, supra note 5, at 19. 
186 Feder, Who Will Subscribe to the Valdez Principles?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1989, § 3, 
at 6, col. 1. S. Noble Robinson, head of Risk Management at Arthur D. Little, Inc., noted, 
"If they say, 'We have reviewed Company X's performance in accord with generally accepted 
accounting principles and it is fine,' that doesn't get you into a very exposed state in terms of 
nitty-gritty details." I d. 
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structured as a financial audit. 187 Third, the proposed audit is likely 
to be costly. A considerably detailed audit would be necessary to 
minimize the chance that environmental problems would remain hid-
den from outside auditors188 and to meet CERES's goal that the 
audit be far more sweeping than real estate audits. Such detail in 
the audit translates to increased cost. Fourth, an audit alone is not 
capable of creating the modern environmental management program 
CERES seeks because audits monitor primarily company compliance 
with the law, and "not every aspect of environmental performance-
such as management awareness and attitude-is quantifiable. "189 
And fifth, the requirement of an independent auditor essentially 
jeopardizes the effectiveness of the audit. 190 
In addition, the type of audit envisioned by CERES poses a num-
ber of potential objections that corporations and their advisors have 
not yet raised. Corporations may object to an extensive independent 
environmental audit if it means losing the confidentiality protection 
available to a corporation when such an extensive audit is done 
internally.191 Corporations also may object to the annual audit per-
formed by independent auditors because they may lose the ability 
to control the scope and timing of the audit and accompanying dis-
closure, as well as the ability to avoid disclosure of facts that, al-
though not legally relevant, can be highly embarrassing or damag-
ing.192 Finally, corporations may be concerned that the independent 
audit, like the disclosure provision, may be a Pandora's box that 
could expose corporations to costly litigation and perhaps civil and 
criminal penalties. 193 
It is possible for CERES to structure an audit that both mollifies 
corporate objections and meets CERES's goals. However, such an 
187 Friedman, Don't Sign the Valdez Principles, ENVTL. F., Mar.lApr. 1990, at 32,40. 
188 Feder, Who Will Subscribe to the Valdez Principles?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1989, § 3, 
at 6, col. 1. This is a common fate of financial audits that are limited in scope. [d. 
189 Friedman, supra note 187, at 40. 
190 See id. at 41. "In-house individual[s], familiar with the operations and credible to the 
facility . . . can determine far more about what is right or wrong with a facility than an 
outsider. " [d. 
191 See S. BLACK & R. POZIN, INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS §§ 6.01-.03 (1989). 
Corporations that perform extensive internal environmental audits may protect from disclo-
sure many of the documents generated during the investigation. See id. This protection is 
grounded alternatively in the attorney-client privilege and the work product privilege, or in 
the self-evaluative privilege. [d. Corporations that perform their own audits and release 
significant material from the investigation to an outside auditor may lose these privileges 
under a waiver theory. [d. § 6.04. Corporations that allow independent auditors to do the 
audit in the first place may never have these privileges to lose. 
192 [d. § 2.01; R. BAUER & D. FENN, supra note 78, at 31. 
193 See Feder, supra note 188. 
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audit would not be a conventional one that merely checks compliance 
with environmental laws. It would be structured as a questionnaire 
and would entail three facets: an operational review, an environ-
mental assessment, and a watch on the processes signatories use to 
manage environmental affairs. Financial accounting standards 
should not provide the primary model for environmental auditing 
standards. 
a. Using a Questionnaire Format 
One of the main corporate objections to the audit proposed by 
CERES is its prohibitive cost, due mostly to the audit's comprehen-
sive nature. CERES, however, views detail in the audit as essential 
to fulfilling its obligation to help investors make informed deci-
sions. 194 Structuring the data collection phase of the audit in the form 
of an extensive questionnaire is likely to quiet objections to cost 
while still offering CERES the opportunity to elicit enough detail 
for a comprehensive audit. 195 Furthermore, in the event that the 
audit is not performed by an outside auditor as anticipated by 
CERES, the questionnaire will serve to focus, in an objective fash-
ion, any audit performed by internal personnel. 
Corporations may find the use of the questionnaire to gather in-
formation for the audit acceptable for several additional reasons. An 
extensive questionnaire has been used effectively in the past as a 
vehicle for gathering information concerning corporate compliance 
with voluntary codes of conduct. 196 Furthermore, questionnaires en-
able auditors to elicit information necessary for both quantitative 
and qualitative analysis of corporate behavior.197 Such analysis is 
essential to a comprehensive audit assessing corporate compliance 
with the Valdez Principles. 198 In addition, use of an extensive ques-
194 See id. 
195 See S. BLACK & R. POZIN, supra note 191, § 4.02. Questionnaires are known to offer 
auditors the ability to obtain detailed information over broad areas at low overall cost. [d. 
196 See TWELFTH REPORT, supra note 88, at 28-30. Arthur D. Little Company uses both 
long and short form questionnaires to gather information on corporate compliance with the 
Sullivan Principles in South Africa. [d. 
197 See id. at 29. Sullivan Principles signatories who submitted a full length questionnaire 
were evaluated both quantitatively and qualitatively in the areas of education, training and 
development, community development, and social justice. [d. 
198 For example, auditors will need to perform quantitative analysis on data to assess 
corporate compliance with pollution control regulations and to compare such compliance with 
others in the industry. Compliance provisions 1, 3, and 5 of the Valdez Code deal with 
minimizing the release of damaging pollutants, minimizing the waste, and reducing environ-
mental and health risks respectively. The three sections will require some type of quantitative 
analysis. See Valdez Principles, supra note 6. In addition, CERES intends to compare each 
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tionnaire to gather information effectively limits the scope of the 
audit and accordingly is more favorable to signatories than a method 
of gathering information that gives auditors widespread access to 
internal corporate affairs. Finally, structuring the audit as a ques-
tionnaire provides flexibility to auditors in eliciting information be-
yond a signatory's compliance with environmental laws. Narrative 
answers prepared by the signatory's staff can be tailored to provide 
operational reviews of the facility, as well as environmental assess-
ments of contaminated sites and ongoing threats to workers and the 
community. Both of these elements are critical in ascertaining 
whether the signatory has adopted a modern approach to environ-
mental management. 199 
b. Financial Accounting Standards as a Model 
CERES intends, in the long term, to set the standards for envi-
ronmental audits, in much the same way the F ASB functions for 
financial audits.20o However, using the F ASB, a regulatory agency, 
as a model for CERES's role in environmental auditing carries many 
negative connotations and should be discarded if CERES wishes to 
develop truly progressive environmental auditing procedures. 
The private sector generally views regulatory agencies in the 
United States at arm's-length; they consider regulatory agencies 
legalistic and reliant upon "confrontational coercion" to achieve their 
goals. 201 CERES will have difficulty obtaining signatories if their 
role in developing and overseeing auditing standards is perceived in 
this negative fashion. In addition, financial accounting standards 
themselves are perceived as discrete rules relating to, among other 
things, the timing of profit and loss recognition,202 accounting for 
research and development costs,203 and the capitalization of interest 
corporation's pollution control technology with the best available technology (BAT) for that 
particular industry. Telephone interview with Michael Fleming, CERES staff member (Jan. 
11, 1991). Auditors also will need information to perform some type of qualitative analysis of 
corporate compliance with the Valdez Principles because CERES plans to document both 
corporate intention to comply with the Valdez Principles and any recognizable changes in such 
corporate intention. I d. 
199 See Friedman, supra note 187, at 40. 
200 Davidson, supra note 136, at 3. 
201 See D. Okimoto, Political Inclusivity: The Domestic Structure of Trade 321 (July 1985) 
(unpublished paper prepared for Japan Political Economy Research Conference). 
202 PRIOR PERIOD ADJUSTMENTS, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 16 
(Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1977). 
203 ACCOUNTING FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COSTS, Statement of Financial Ac-
counting Standards No.2 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1974). 
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cost.204 Environmental auditing is considered too "diverse and fluid" 
to be analyzed effectively under such a structured approach. 205 
Accordingly, CERES should try to identify openly with regulatory 
bodies that seek to achieve their ends through a cooperative ap-
proach involving negotiation and mutual accommodation, rather than 
with the regulatory approach industry associates with the F ASB. 
The fact that, in practice, CERES does approach the development 
of auditing standards through mutual negotiation with signatories206 
may not in and of itself dispel the negatives of identifying with the 
F ASB. Also, CERES should strive to develop more comprehensive 
auditing standards without relying heavily on the financial account-
ing standards as a model. The diversity among industries dealing 
with environmental issues, as well as the diversity of the issues 
themselves, lends itself to a completely unique approach to auditing, 
one that must be worked out by CERES and signatories together. 
c. Process of Environmental Management: Checklist and Rating 
Systems 
Good audits are said to be not mere checklists, but operational 
reviews. 207 However, a good audit may include a checklist of the 
processes used by signatories in moving toward the goal of aggres-
sive environmental management. Such a list could be used to deter-
mine whether each signatory is using the most modern methods of 
environmental management according to the standards of the sig-
natory's industry. 208 
The checklist generally would assess the procedures signatories 
use to achieve the basic objectives of environmental management: 
[a]n environmental management program should include regular, 
timely, and uniform reporting from the operating line through 
senior management to the board of directors. . . . [I]t should 
seek prompt identification and resolution of environmental 
problems .... [I]t should identify developing issues and trends 
and establish preventive programs and procedures, such as no-
204 CAPITALIZATION OF INTEREST COST, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 
34 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1979). 
205 Friedman, supra note 187, at 40. 
206 THE 1990 CERES GUIDE, supra note 176, at 19. "CERES plans to work with signatory 
companies in devising audit standards that are effective and manageable." ld. 
207 Friedman, supra note 187, at 41. 
208 Performance evaluations that seek to compare signatories in the same industry, or 
apples to apples, is "only common sense," according to one supporter of the Valdez Principles. 
Meyers, Business's New Ten Commandments, ENVTL. F., Mar./Apr. 1990, at 33, 42. 
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tification and review of capital expenditures for pollution control 
technology. 209 
In preparing the checklist, CERES should ascertain which signato-
ries are in the forefront of environmental management in each in-
dustry, and list the procedures that they follow in addressing envi-
ronmental issues. 21o Thereafter, as part of the audit, the procedures 
of other signatories could be "checked" against those of the "model" 
for the industry. 
CERES may consider instituting a rating system to compare how 
signatories in each industry fair against the model. 211 A rating sys-
tem evaluating firms within each industry is essential because en-
vironmental issues are industry-specific, and any disclosure without 
some idea of the industry standard would be misleading.212 Accord-
ingly, a rating of signatories on this basis would help investors 
determine just how sophisticated a signatory's environmental man-
agement program is compared to others in the industry. It essen-
tially would provide a yardstick of commitment to environmental 
progress. 
d. Public Report of Audit Results 
After the audit is complete, corporate signatories are likely to 
have concerns over the tone and degree of specificity of any report 
made available to the public. Corporations will find it difficult to 
agree to a level of disclosure in the audit that could lead to increased 
209 Friedman, supra note 187, at 40. 
210 Elements of an effective environmental management program vary with the type of 
industry involved. [d. at 40. 
211 Rating systems currently are used by socially responsible investment firms to "rate 
firms on the environment." Kirkpatrick, supra note 135, at 47. Franklin Research & Devel-
opment of Boston rates companies on a scale of 1 to 5, using several factors to make the 
analysis. [d. Each company starts with a score of 3, which is then increased or decreased 
based on corporate actions to help or harm the environment. [d. 
In addition, rating systems have been used in the past to rate compliance with voluntary 
codes of conduct. One such system was used by Arthur D. Little Company to reflect the 
progress of signatories to the Sullivan Principles in relation to others. See TWELFTH REPORT, 
supra note 88, at 28. 
212 Norms against which the public can judge a firm's performance are partiCUlarly important 
to include in an audit report so that the context of disclosure is not misleading. Four types of 
norms have been suggested for inclusion in a social audit: performance by other companies in 
the industry, performance by similar firms in the same geographical location, performance 
with respect to legal requirements, and performance with respect to what is possible in a 
given location. R. BAUER & D. FENN, supra note 78, at 72. Comparison ofa firm's performance 
against norms in the industry is the most informative context when evaluating environmental 
issues. 
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litigation, require disclosure beyond federal and state require-
ments,213 cause confidentiality problems,214 or place corporations in 
a misleading or unfavorable light. 215 CERES, however, does not 
contemplate minimal public disclosure if the audit, but intends that 
the audit enable environmentalists and investors to determine the 
status of the corporation's environmental management program. For 
example, an audit should reveal whether the grounding of the Exxon 
Valdez is a sign that Exxon is operating in an unsound way compared 
with other oil companies, or whether the corporation was just un-
lucky. 216 
The annual CERES Report provides a mechanism for disseminat-
ing audit results to the public while pacifying corporate objection. 
Essentially, to comply with the reporting requirements for the au-
diting and assessment provisions, signatories will provide narrative 
answers to the following questions, among others: 
-Describe the company's annual health, safety, and environ-
mental assessment of its operations and company compliance 
with environmental laws and regulations. 
-How does the company make an annual audit of its production 
processes and other activities to ascertain how it can use less 
hazardous materials and produce less waste? 
-When has the company conducted and up-dated audits of all 
its properties to identify sites of contamination? 
-Does the company have an outside audit firm review and com-
ment upon its internal audit procedures? Do outside reviews 
include some form of spot-checking of a company's internal audit 
results?217 
Because each signatory writes its own answers to questions in the 
CERES Report,218 confidentiality, tone, and specificity problems vir-
tuallyare eliminated. Signatories can draft answers in a manner in 
which they feel comfortable. For example, signatories may limit 
disclosure of information in sensitive areas to that legally required 
under federal or state law,219 thereby avoiding increased litigation 
m See Feder, supra note 188. This same issue will arise again in the context of objections 
to the separate "disclosure" provision of the Valdez Principles. 
214 See Zoll, supra note 156, at 45. 
215 See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
216 See Feder, supra note 188. 
217 THE 1990 CERES GUIDE, supra note 176, at 16. Additional, more detailed questions 
will be developed by CERES in consultation with a Corporate Advisory Committee comprised 
of signatory companies. Id. at 12. 
218 Id. at 11. The CERES Report gives each signatory the opportunity to explain and 
discuss their achievements in complying with each principle. Id. 
219 See supra notes 162-69 and accompanying text. 
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or penalties. In addition, signatories can ensure that disclosures on 
company performance are informative and not misleading to the 
public. The narrative format also allows signatories to comment on 
their own individual environmental performance as reflected by audit 
results. 220 
The suggestions for structuring the audit provision were based on 
an analysis of the methodologies that have been used for corporate, 
social, and financial audits in light of voiced and anticipated signatory 
objections. However, the best way for CERES to ensure that the 
audit provision would be structured in a manner acceptable to cor-
porations was to obtain corporate input in formulating specific guide-
lines for the audit. It is apparent that CERES worked with signatory 
companies to devise audit protocols that are both effective and man-
ageable. 221 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The legal framework of corporate environmental responsibility is 
extensive; laws alone, however, cannot effectively promote corporate 
environmental responsibility because our government acts primarily 
in a reactive, not a proactive, manner.222 Accordingly, CERCLA, 
the SEC disclosure rules, and the Superfund disclosure rules can 
never foster a truly aggressive approach to corporate environmental 
responsibility. They will impose liability only on those who are not 
environmentally responsible enough to meet minimum environmen-
tal standards. At best, legally required corporate responsibility can 
supply a high base line for environmental responsibility in those 
areas under the Valdez Principles, such as disclosure, where corpo-
rations will not be as aggressive initially. 
As a voluntary code of environmental conduct, the Valdez Prin-
ciples can successfully foster an aggressive approach to corporate 
environmental responsibility. Given that the disclosure and auditing 
provisions of the code are drafted in a manner that appears to be 
acceptable to corporations, the social and economic pressures that 
propelled the Sullivan Principles are likely to persuade corporations 
to sign on to the Valdez Principles and strive toward compliance. 
220 THE 1990 CERES GUIDE, supra note 176, at 11. A variation of this technique was used 
successfully in the Arthur D. Little Reports on the Signatory Companies to the Sullivan 
Principles. There, individual signatory comments were anonymous and were used primarily 
to "convey the nature of the activities performed by the Signatories to alleviate unfair 
conditions in South Africa." TWELFTH REPORT, supra note 88, at 2. 
221 THE 1990 CERES GUIDE, supra note 176, at 19. 
222 R. BAUER & D. FENN, supra note 78, at 16. 
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Meanwhile, the atmosphere for the acceptance and success of the 
Valdez Principles continues to ripen. Since the release of the Valdez 
Principles in 1989, CERES has obtained sixteen signatories at the 
time of this writing. 223 In the Spring of 1990, shareholders in five 
major companies voted in unprecedented numbers for increased cor-
porate environmental responsibility.224 The shareholder votes far 
exceeded both CERES's expectations and the track record for any 
similar resolution calling for a voluntary code of conduct, such as the 
Sullivan Principles or the McBride Principles. 225 College officials 
predict that environmental concerns could attract as much attention 
on campuses in the 1990s as divestiture from South Africa did in the 
1980s.226 For example, Radcliffe College and Stanford, among others, 
have begun to vote in favor of all resolutions asking companies to 
report on the Valdez Principles. 227 Finally, polls show that the public 
is beginning to believe that protecting the environment is important 
and that environmental improvements must be made regardless of 
cost. 228 
223 Telephone interview with Michael Fleming, CERES staff member (Jan. 11, 1991). 
224 CERES "Valdez Principles" Shareholder Resolutions Garner Record-Breaking Totals 
(June 7, 1990) (CERES press release). American Express, Atlantic Richfield, Exxon, Kerr-
McGee, and United Pacific were the target of efforts by shareholders to require that the 
companies report on their compliance with the Valdez Principles. ld. Thirteen other companies 
agreed to file the requested report before the resolution went before shareholders. ld. 
225 ld. All five Valdez Resolutions tallied at least 8.5% of the shareholder vote. ld. According 
to Joan Bavaria, CERES co-chairperson, vote totals exceeding three percent on a resolution 
introduced without company support are considered a success. ld. The vote totals for the five 
Valdez Resolutions were as follows: American Express-8.5%, Atlantic Richfield-14.2%, 
Exxon-9.5%, Kerr-McGee-16.7%, and Union Pacific-13.6%. ld. 
226 Magner, Efforts Under Way to Persuade Universities to Use Investments to Press 
Business on the Environment, Chronicle of Higher Educ., Apr. 25, 1990, at AI, col. 4. Some 
investment advisors to universities believe that the environment could attract more attention 
and emotion than South Africa because the environment affects everyone and everyone can 
do something about it. ld. However, there are those that doubt that environmentalism will 
affect campuses as strongly as the divestiture movement because: first, there is likely to be 
little agreement among campuses as to what constitutes environmentally sound corporate 
behavior; second, there is not yet the same sense of outrage about the environment as there 
was with South Africa; and third, because colleges have research labs that produce hazardous 
waste, criticizing corporate practices may be the case of the "pot calling the kettle black." I d. 
at AI, col. 3, A3, col. 3. CERES, however, is undaunted by such doubts and has started 
distributing a student action guide as of fall 1990 to rouse campus support for the Valdez 
Principles. CERES, STUDENT ACTION GUIDE TO THE ENVIRONMENT (Fall 1990). 
227 Magner, supra note 226, at A3, col. 2. 
22" Kirkpatrick, supra note 135, at 44, 46. The New York Times/CBS News poll asks people 
whether "protecting the environment is so important that requirements and standards cannot 
be too high, and continuing environmental improvements must be made regardless of cost." 
ld. at 46. Seventy-nine percent of those polled in June of 1989 agreed with the statement as 
opposed to 45% in September 1981. ld. Accordingly, it appears that public opinion is swaying 
in favor of environmentalism. 
500 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 18:457 
The Valdez Principles are progress-oriented in a time when laws 
are reactive and the public, investors, and shareholders want more. 
Once the wrinkles are ironed out, the Principles will open a new and 
aggressive phase of environmental awareness and corporate envi-
ronmental responsibility. 
